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Previous literature available related to ICA (indirect comparative advertising) is 
limited due to the better effectiveness of DCA (direct comparative advertising), while 
competing against a specific competitor on specific featured attributes. However, recent 
studies, which point out the superiority of ICA in positioning a brand against overall 
competitors in the entire market, urge the theoretical and managerial exploration of it. 
This research step to fill the gap on how ICA could function well based on 
popular persuasion models: Resource-matching theory and Dual-process models 
theories, considering individuals' differences – Need for Cognition. What's more, 
metacognitive difficulty, a concept ignored in persuasion models before but now getting 
increasing attention, was also taken into consideration as a factor to find how it could 
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Comparative Advertising, categorized into Direct Comparative Advertising (DCA) 
and Indirect Comparative Advertising (ICA), is widely utilized nowadays by advertisers 
as an effective way to improve brand equity and increase market share. However, ICA 
did not obtain enough attention in previous research concerning limited deployment. 
The lack of attention to ICA, due to its inferiority compared with DCA, implied by the 
literature in the past century, in positioning the advertised product against the specific 
competitor used as a point of comparison (Miniard, 2006). However, recent studies 
showed that ICA functions better than DCA, while positioning a brand against the entire 
market along featured attributes. Considering its extensive utilization in future market 
promotion, ICA is worth exploring thoroughly in its theoretical and managerial aspects. 
According to Beard (2011), previous comparative advertising studies mainly 
focus on the process outcome (e.g. cognitive, affective, conative) with situational factors 
such as market share (small/large), product quality (high/low), claims credibility, 
creativity, and degree of negativity (Grewal et al., 1997; Rogers & Williams, 1989; 
Beard, 2013). Most studies explored how the main effect of comparative advertising 
was varied by one-way interaction with those moderators related to practical or 
cognitive aspects, while none of them considered the metacognitive factor, or individual 
differences. 
Therefore, this paper, unlike most previous research which detects the main 
effects of difference between DCA and ICA, and the interaction related to other 
situational factors, explores whether two of the most popular persuasion models (Dual 
Mediation Model and Cognitive Resource Matching theory) function well within indirect 
comparative advertising, and how the metacognitive factor and individual differences 
(Need for Cognition) interact with each other based on the superiority of ICA against the 
entire market. As a result, it could not only fill the gap in the literature concerning ICA 
and metacognitive experience, but it could also help advertisers design effective ICA 
strategy at the managerial level. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Comparative Advertising 
During the first half of the twentieth century, comparative advertising started to be 
recognized and then gradually widely criticized by advertisers. It peaked during the 
1970s thanks to the advertising self-regulation encouraged by Federal Trade 
Commission (FTA) in the USA (Barry, 1993; Beard, 2011). Around 2,000 magazine ads 
published between 1900s to 1980s were analyzed by Pollay (1985), who reported that 
“implied” comparative advertising which generally mentioned competitive standing 
(referred as Indirect Comparative Advertising, now) were quite popular, with an average 
of 25% across the decades. While the “explicit” comparative advertising which included 
“clues” to the identity of competitors (referred as Direct Comparative Advertising now) 
were only 2% on the average (at the greatest frequency of use, 4%, in the 1970s). 
Recently, with the increasing research and the support of advertising laws in 
different countries, comparative advertising is becoming more popular. However, it is 
worth to notice that the level of acceptance of Indirect and Direct comparative 
advertising is different. In India, the U.K., and the U.S.A., comparative advertisement 
(including ICA and DCA) is encouraged ”since comparative advertising provides 
consumers with information about both parties' products through a quick comparison, 
effectively results in lower prices, encourages competition, and helps prevent 
monopolies” by laws1. However, in China, the advertising law initially adopted in 1994, 
which did not allow any comparative ads, has been modified in September 2015 and 
“allows comparative advertising in China so long as there are no direct comparisons 
between advertisements”2. Except laws, cultural differences also have an influence on 
the choosing of comparative ads by advertisers. High context cultures, like India, Asia, 
or Latin America prefer indirect and ambiguous messages (Miracle, Chang, & Taylor, 
1992, Ulijn & Kumar, 1999; Kalro et al., 2010), and thus DCA is more acceptable than 
ICA in low context cultures such as Germany, the U.K., and the U.S.A. 
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Although ICA accounts for a notable proportion of advertisements recently, it 
attracted less attention than DCA in the literature as a large part of comparative ads 
studies conducted is focused on DCA in the USA before the late 1990s (Williams & 
Page, 2013; Beard, 2018). As Miniard (2006) summed up: “these studies have 
repeatedly shown that DC advertising is superior to NC (non-comparative) advertising in 
positioning the advertised product against the specific competitor used as a point of 
comparison (e.g., Dröge & Darmon 1987; Gorn & Weinberg 1984; Miniard, Rose, 
Barone, & Manning 1993; Rose, Miniard, Barone, Manning, & Till 1993).” As a result, 
advertisers were advised to use DCA instead of ICA. However, Miniard (2006) found 
that more effectiveness was obtained by ICA claiming superiority over all competitors 
than DCA in positioning a brand against the entire market along featured attributes. 
Considering the practical popularity in high context cultures and the theoretical 
superiority on competing overall competitors, ICA is worth to be explored further to fill 
the gap on the research in comparative advertisements. 
2.2 Metacognitive experience 
Metacognitive experience, described as "ease or difficulty with which some 
information can be brought to mind, or the fluency with which new information can be 
processed" (Schwarz, 2004; p. 332), is widely researched in the marketing domain. The 
reason is that when consumers are viewing the advertisement or searching for what 
they need, the ease or difficulty of metacognitive experience, combined with product 
information, is used to determine product evaluation (Schwarz, 2004). And compared to 
metacognitive knowledge and regulation (the other two components consist of 
metacognition; Flavell, 1979), the metacognitive experience is the part that could be 
easily manipulated by researchers or advertising companies outside the experimental 
context. 
Many studies believe that the positive impact of metacognitive ease of 
processing on the evaluative judgment is due to a perceived connection between ease 
and familiarity or between difficulty and unfamiliarity (Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; 
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Lee, 2001; Schwarz, 2004; Winkielman et al., 2003). The most compelling evidence for 
the connection between ease and liking comes from studies that directly manipulated 
processing dynamics. In the 1990s, there were several types of two-step models to 
explain it (as cited in Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001): 
“Nonspecific activation model: processing manipulations do not elicit any 
affective reactions but merely produce the greater accessibility of the activated 
representation" (Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 1987, p. 646); Fluency-attribution 
model: processing manipulations lead to an affectively neutral experience of fluency 
(Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1994; Jacoby et al., 1989; Seamon, Brody, & Kauff, 1983); 
Familiarity-attribution model: processing manipulations elicit a vague feeling of 
familiarity (Bonanno & Stillings, 1986; Klinger & Greenwald, 1994; Smith, 1998).” 
Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001) summarize these models as follow: 
“First, they assume that changes in experience are affectively neutral and have 
no genuine affective consequences. Second, they assume that the process of 
explaining the change in the cognitive experience is equally likely to lead to more 
positive or more negative evaluations of the stimulus, depending on the context.” 
However, Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001) support a hedonic fluency model in 
that processing facilitation elicits a genuine affective reaction and that the affective 
reaction is hedonically positive. Different from the former models, this model predicts 
that processing facilitation should be accompanied by an increase in positive 
evaluations but should not be accompanied by an increase in negative evaluations, 
even if the rating context is negative. They design experiments to test the positive 
attitude reaction produced by processing facilitation with incipient facial activity 
monitored by electromyography (EMG). Results of these studies revealed that easy-to-
process stimuli were associated with higher activity over the zygomaticus region, which 
is the brain area associated with pleasure, and thus increase corresponding evaluation 
of liking, popularity, fame, value, optimism, familiarity and unwillingness to dispose of a 
product (Labroo & Pocheptsova, 2016).  
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The ease of metacognitive experience increasing product evaluation has been 
researched and shown by many different studies through different models. However, in 
the recent ten years, some studies (listed as below) indicate that complexity, 
interestingness, and not becoming bored can be the advantages of the metacognitive 
difficulty, outcompeting the ease under certain conditions. Three broad sets of findings 
have now emerged showing that the effects of metacognitive difficulty vary from 
negative to positive: 
First, the effect of metacognitive experience is sensitive to the consumption 
domain (Labroo & Dhar, 2010). The common association between ease of experience 
and feeling of familiarity is based on the naive theory, which refers that the feeling of 
ease people experience while processing information leads them to infer that their 
comprehension is high, whereas the feeling of difficulty leads them to infer that their 
comprehension is low (Miele & Molden, 2010), and people naturally prefer those that 
they comprehend easily rather than those they comprehend with difficulty. However, the 
positive relationship between familiarity and liking may be reversed in consumption 
domains in which people hold the opposite lay beliefs regarding the link between 
familiarity and liking. Labroo and Dhar (2010) assumed that in consumption domains in 
which consumers hold the belief that uniqueness and lower familiarity are signals of 
higher value, metacognitive difficulty would be interpreted as a positive cue and would 
result in greater liking. 
Second, the negative effects of metacognitive difficulty are reversed to positive 
for consumers who are goal-pursuing (Labroo & Kim, 2009). A lot of existing research 
shows that if the characteristics of a stimulus are easy to process, feelings of ease arise 
during processing of that stimulus. These feelings are beneficial and increase liking of 
the stimulus (Berlyne, 1966; Bornstein, 1989; Schwarz, 2004; Zajonc, 1968). However, 
there is also a common sense that when people are pursuing some valuable things, 
efforts are usually required. People would like to invest their efforts on the target 
objects, which is instrumental to realize their goals. Thus efforts are always associated 
with value when pursuing goals. Because efforts are also required when processing 
metacognitive difficulty, people would regard metacognitive difficulty which need efforts 
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as a sign of valuable instrument to achieve goals, and subsequently increase the liking 
of those difficult target objects (Labroo & Kim, 2009). 
Third, the difficulty in metacognitive experience can make consumers feel 
challenged and stimulate them to extend their existing knowledge of brands, especially 
for mastering new information (Lee & Shavitt, 2009).  Different from those researchers 
who examined attitude formation toward new or unfamiliar targets of metacognitive 
inferences, Lee and Shavitt (2009) argue that effects of metacognitive experiences may 
be distinct from well-established brands. They find that metacognitive difficulty indeed 
can lead to a reduction in perceived understanding, and impulse consumers to seek 
available cue in judging or formulating purchase intention for an established brand, 
which can be manipulated by a brand manager; but it happens only when a person 
consider the difficult experience as relevant to the state of his or her brand 
representation, and this effect is moderated by the extent to which consumers’ 
motivation to maintain cognitive closure by seizing on available information is either 
chronically high or intensified by time pressure. This finding was distinct from the 
existing model of brand association network, which did not view the role of consumers’ 
motivation as critical to learn new information, which is a kind of promotion in realizing 
consumer learning in the brand representation literature. As for managerial implications, 
it suggests that brand managers’ goals should include the management of consumer’s 
metacognitive understanding of brands, not merely the management of the brand 
concept. 
2.3 Need for Cognition 
Need for cognition refers to an individual's tendency to engage in and enjoy 
activities that require thinking (e.g., brainstorming, puzzles). Specifically, It is a 
personality variable reflecting the extent to which individuals are inclined towards 
effortful cognitive activities. Some individuals have relatively little motivation for 
cognitively complex tasks. These individuals are described as being low in need for 
cognition. Other individuals consistently engage in and enjoy cognitively challenging 
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activities and are referred to as being high in need for cognition. An individual may fall at 
any point in the distribution, however (Cacioppo et al., 1996).  
2.4 Dual-Mediation Models 
Dual-process models are a series of similar models to explain the mechanism 
where persuasion occurs. The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) is one of the most 
popular models among DMM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 
1983). The foundation of DMM theories was that there are two distinct routes while 
processing the information: a systematic or central route, as well as a heuristic or 
peripheral route. When the elaboration likelihood is high, viewers engaged in more 
effortful processing of information and generate more cognitive thoughts; on the 
contrary, viewers put less effort to analyze the ad's content when there are fewer 
resources available, and they turn to making a judgment based on heuristics, affect 
transfer, or less effortful message processing (Coulter et al., 2004). 
In DMM models, several factors or combinations are proved to lead to the 
peripheral route. The nature of people who tend to avoid effortful thinking (Cacioppo, 
Petty, & Morris, 1983), the appeal in the information which is personally inconsequential 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1979), engagement in distracting tasks while processing the 
information (Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976), and limited prior knowledge on the issue 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1980; Wood, 1982), could largely reduce the elaboration likelihood 
of issue-related thinking, and subjects would turn to depend on existing schemata and 
superficial analyses to make a decision which seems “reasonable”, but actually it either 
have no intrinsic link to the attitude stimulus, or a simple inference related to the cues in 
persuasion context (e.g., the more arguments for a recommendation, the better it must 
be) (Petty & Cacioppo. 1984). 
On the contrary, according to Petty and Cacioppo (1984), high attendance to the 
appeal, willingness to access relevant associations, images and experience from 
memory, and to analyse the arguments with the data extracted from memory to derive 
an overall evaluation, will highly effect people’s motivation and ability to engage in 
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issue-relevant thinking, or go through the central route where elaboration likelihood is 
viewed as high. 
However, this model has its limitations. It exclusively focuses on whether the 
supplication of cognitive resources that could be devoted to thoughtful message 
analysis is adequate, but it ignores that the evaluation of adequacy also depends on the 
resource demands imposed by the content of the ads (Meyers-Levy & Malaviya, 1999), 
such as complexity. Thus the Resource-Matching theory which considers both the level 
of requirement for message processing and the level of the supplication of cognitive 
resources invested into message understanding becomes an indispensable supplement 
part to understanding persuasion. 
2.5 Cognitive Resource Matching Theory 
Anand and Sternthal (1989) first came out with a theory that persuasion could be 
affected by the matching of the supply of cognitive resources that a person devotes to 
message processing and the demands for resources that a message effectively 
requires if it is to be processed. The amount of resources that are available for 
allocation to message processing is called "Resource Allocation" (RA; also named 
required cognitive availability), and the resource that message recipients perceived they 
required for the processing task is named "Resource Requirement" (RR; Keller & Block, 
1997). According to Keith and Girish (2004), when RA<RR, persuasion is likely to be 
diminished due to incomplete, superficial, or inefficient message processing, and fewer 
positive brand-related cognitions are generated. When RA>RR, message recipients 
may generate many advocacy-consonant cognitions, but at the same time, they might 
also invest their excess resources which exceed the requirement to question the 
message assertions or produce advocacy-irrelevant negative thoughts (Meyers-Levy & 
Malaviya, 1999). Besides, boredom, tedium, or "wear-out" effects might also appear. In 
sum, the smaller the gap between the level of resource allocation and the level of 
resource required for comprehension of the message, the better the effect of the 
intended message to be processed, because the message will be understood more 
properly without producing unrelated negative thoughts. 
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However, it is worth to notice that only under the condition that evokes resource-
intensive, systematic message processing, the resource matching theory seems to be 
applicable (Meyers-Levy & Peracchio, 1995, 1999). That is because when people go 
through the peripheral processing, they will rely on a subset of the message cues 
(especially heuristic cues) which required less cognitive effort to making judgments, 
instead of doing excessive message processing. This superficial, inadequate 
processing makes the resource requirement invalid. In sum, under heuristic processing 
conditions, whether the level of RR is high or low doesn't matter, for people will ignore 
the level of RR and always choose the way which needs the least cognitive efforts to 
judge. 
3.0 Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Hypothesis under CRM 
The hypotheses below are based on condition that evokes resource-intensive, 
systematic message processing, where resource matching theory could be applicable. 
3.1.1 RR and Metacognitive experience  
Considering the metacognitive experience which was always manipulated by 
adjusting the number of cognitive efforts that the subjects are perceived to expend on 
understanding the content of the stimulus (Labroo & Dhar, 2010; Labroo & Kim, 2009), I 
could notice that the difficulty level of metacognitive experience is corresponding to the 
level of resource requirement. (Even the cognitive efforts needed to input for 
understanding the content is the same, the metacognitive difficulty could make people 
feel difficulty to understand mentally and improve RR). 
H1: Metacognitive difficulty implies a high level of RR because more efforts are 
expected to be devoted to understand the message. On the contrary, metacognitive 
ease is less resource demanding (lower level of RR). 
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3.1.2 RA and NFC 
As for the cognitive resource allocation process, its operation through which the 
motivation affects choice, action, and ultimately performance could be separated into 
two types: distal motivational process and proximal motivational process (Kanfer & 
Ackerman, 1989). Kanfer and Ackerman (1989) pointed out that "Distal processes are 
initially antecedent to task engagement. Specifically, its decision sets the stage for 
resource availability during task engagement''. Through this process, we could decide 
on daily choices, such as what to wear or which work tasks to begin first. But when we 
finish making the decision, then we will enter the proximal motivational process which 
requires sustained attentional effort to solve the difficulties in the tasks (Bandura, 1986). 
Thus, the attentional effort was usually measured to represent the level of resource 
allocation (Coulter et al., 2004; Laczniak & Muehling,1993). These resource allocation 
processes consist of self-regulatory activities: self-monitoring, self-evaluation, and self-
reaction. Among these self-regulatory activities, individuals will allocate their attention 
based on the expected consequence of their behavior (for example, whether it is 
important or helpful to their goals), the comparison between the progress of their goal-
performance with certain standard, or even individual differences (for example, the 
person with an action orientation who is task-focused and the person with a state 
orientation who is vulnerable to emotion will naturally take different self-regulation 
activities) (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Meyers-Levy and Malaviya (1999) explain more 
specifically that "the allocation of resources is determined by characteristics of the 
message recipient (e.g., his or her message involvement, expertise, or need for 
cognition), the advertising message (e.g., its complexity, inclusion of pictures, or use of 
music), and the context in which the message is received (e.g. the programming, 
editorial, and advertising context)". 
According to the ELM (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), the level of Need for Cognition 
(NFC) belongs to one of the predominant factors in enhancing motivation, and NFC is 
positively related to motivation of processing (Kirk, 2009) (which means individuals with 
higher NFC, who are assumed to process information more extensively, would be 
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expected to generate more thoughts). And the level of Resource Availability (RA) can 
be manipulated by varying processing motivation (Keith & Girish, 2004).  
H2: High Need for Cognition implies a high level of RA through enhancing the 
motivation of processing (Low Need for Cognition implies a low level of RA). 
3.1.3 Metacognitive Experience and RA on persuasion 
If H1 is supported, which means the metacognitive experience indeed could be 
used to manipulate resource requirements, according to CRM, we could assume that 
there is an interaction between metacognitive experience and RA on persuasion: the 
smaller the gap between the level of resource allocation and the level of resource 
required for comprehension of the message, the better the effectiveness of the intended 
message to be processed because the message will be understood more properly 
without producing unrelated negative thoughts. 
Considering the assumption of Keller and Block(1997) who manipulated resource 
requirements with vividness to explore the CRM, here I assume that increasing 
resource allocation leads to a non-monotonic response for the meta-cognitive ease 
information and a linearly increasing trend for the meta-cognitive difficulty information 
concerning persuasion (As in Figure 1 below). If these outcomes are obtained, 
metacognitive ease is likely at a moderate level of resource allocation but not at a low or 
high level. 
H3 (a): When metacognitive experience is difficult, the persuasion will keep improving 
with the increased level of RA because the RA level is getting close to the RR level. 
H3 (b): When metacognitive experience is easy, the persuasion will experience an 
improvement first, then reach a peak at the mid-level of RA, and stop improving or even 




Figure 1: CRM model 
 
 Low RA Mid RA High RA 
Metacognitive 
Ease RA<RR RA=RR RA>RR 
Metacognitive 
Difficulty RA<RR RA<RR RA=RR 
3.2 Hypothesis under DMM 
The hypotheses below are based on general conditions that two routes 
(systematic or central) of processing the information could be followed, an environment 
where the Dual Mediation Model could function well. 
3.2.1 Metacognitive Experience and NFC on persuasion 
Generally speaking, people in high NFC are more curious and enjoy thinking, and 
they have a high need to process the information. For people in low NFC, they are 
cognitive misers who would not engage in effortful thinking and always ‘avoid cognitive 
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works that derive their attitudes based on the merits of arguments presented' 
(Cacipoppo & Petty, 1982; Haugtvedt et al., 1992). As a result, high NFC more 
thoroughly analyzes the information of the ad than low NFC individuals (Ruiz & Sicilia, 
2004; Mantel & Kardes, 1999; Peltier & Schibrowsky, 1994). To be specific, high NFC 
individuals' attitudes on the products are more based on the evaluation of product 
attributes, while low NFC individuals are more based on simple peripheral cues inherent 
in the ads (Haugtvedt et al., 1992). 
According to previous research (Alter et al., 2007), metacognitive difficulty 
activates analytic reasoning. Here I assume that for people in low NFC, whether the 
cognitive experience is easy or difficult does not have a significant influence on their 
evaluation, because they always try to avoid effortful thinking and thus they are not 
sensitive to cognitive irritation. 
As for people in high NFC, metacognitive difficulty acts as stimulation that evokes 
critical thinking, prompts them to invest more effort to analyze the information, and thus 
leads them to analytical analysis on specific claims in the ads to make assertions. On 
the one hand, analytical analysis which leads to a central route could motivate people to 
accept new information more effectively. Richard and John (1986) mentioned that a 
“negativity bias” happened in comparative ads. They implied that people who view 
comparative ads containing criticisms to competitors are prone to go through central 
route to persuasion, leading to integration of new message and long-term attitude 
change. 
However, on the other hand, counter-arguments and negative thoughts are also 
activated and rejection of the message could also become a result. Jain and Posavac 
(2004) find that if the advertiser badmouths all other competitors, claims that he is better 
than all the others, more counter-arguments will be encouraged because consumers 
may find it difficult to believe it. As in the comparative ads, the comparison brand is 
always the leading bargain brand in the market; thus the strong claims on the 
competitive advantages of the advertised brand are easy to produce discrepancy with 
consumers' beliefs and counterarguments. As a result, they are prone to question the 
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claim of ads, produce suspicion or advocacy-irrelevant negative thoughts. All of those 
excessive thinking will lead to the lower effectiveness of persuasion for people in high 
NFC. 
H4 (a): For people with high NFC, persuasion will be significantly lower in the 
metacognitive ease condition than in the difficulty condition. 
H4 (b): For people with high NFC, persuasion will be significantly higher in the 
metacognitive ease condition than in the difficulty condition 
H5: While for people with low NFC, the difference of persuasion between the 
metacognitive ease condition and the difficulty condition is not significant. 
As Figure 2 shows below, here comes the model from H1 to H5: 
 
Figure 2: Research Model 
 
3.3 From Persuasion to Attitude evaluation 
3.3.1 Attitude toward ads/brands and Purchase Intention 
If the previous hypotheses on persuasion are supported, will the interactions 
between NFC and Metacognitive Experience, and between RA and Metacognitive 
Experience on persuasion, also transfer to ad effectiveness measure (such as attitude, 
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certainty, and purchase intention)? According to the naive theory, the feeling of ease 
people experience while processing information leads them to infer that their 
comprehension is high, whereas the feeling of difficulty leads them to infer that their 
comprehension is low (Miele & Molden, 2010), and people naturally prefer those that 
they comprehend easily rather than those comprehend with difficulty. Thus generally 
people have more positive attitudes when experiencing the metacognitive ease 
condition than the difficult condition. However, as individuals in high NFC would be 
expected to be critical thinkers and to not necessarily accept these arguments on face 
value (Kirk 2008), which means they are less affected by familiarity-liking link (prefer 
systematic path more than hedonic path). Thus I assume that people with high NFC will 
generate more extent of positive attitude from metacognitive difficulty to ease, 
compared to those with low NFC. However, if counter arguments were too much in the 
influent information processing and lead to a lower persuasion, the attitude of people in 
high NFC could also become negative towards metacognitive difficulty. 
H6 (a): For people with high NFC, there will be a more positive attitude of ads/brands 
and purchase intention toward metacognitive difficulty than those with low NFC. 
H6 (b): For people with high NFC, there will be a more negative attitude of ads/brands 
and purchase intention toward metacognitive difficulty than those with low NFC 
H6(c): For people with high NFC, the difference of mean attitude of ads/brands and 
purchase intention will be larger between ease and difficult condition, compared to 
people with low NFC. 
3.3.2 Certainty 
Tormala and Rucker(2007) summed that 'Attitude certainty refers to the 
subjective sense of conviction one has about one's attitude or the extent to which one is 
confident or sure of one's attitude (Abelson, 1988; Festinger, 1954; Gross, Holtz, & 
Miller, 1995). Thus, attitude certainty is a metacognitive aspect of attitudes in that it 
reflects a secondary cognition (e.g., Ron is certain that he dislikes sharks) attached to a 
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primary cognition (i.e., Ron's negative attitude toward sharks) (Petty, Briñol, Tormala, & 
Wegener, 2007).' 
According to previous research, subjective experience is one of the factors that 
affect attitude certainty (Haddock et al., 1999): people were more certain of their 
attitudes after reviewing an easy (small) rather than a difficult (large) number of 
arguments. I can deduct that metacognitive difficulty could lessen the intensity of 
certainty. 
Besides, according to Tormala and Petty (2002), several variables can moderate 
the impact of people's perceived response to persuasion messages on attitude 
certainty, and perceived processing effort is one of them. When people under high 
cognitive load, because they were distracted when processing the information, feel less 
certain about their attitudes. While for low cognitive load people, they have a higher 
certainty level because they believed they had thought more carefully about the 
message. Here I could deduce that resource allocation, the attention, and effort that 
people allocated to processing the message, could have positive effects on the 
certainty. 
Thus, I assume that the RA could work as a moderator that could have an 
interaction with metacognitive experience on attitude certainty. When the content of ads 
is easy to process, more attention is put into the ads, they will be sure that they 
understand the ads and thus become more confident. However, because the difficulty 
makes people feel it is hard to understand the content of ads, they will always feel not 
that confident towards their judgment and decision despite putting more attention to the 
ads (even uncertainty could be strengthened). 
H7: Under the metacognitive ease condition, the certainty will be strengthened with the 
increase of RA level. However, under metacognitive difficulty, the certainty change to a 
significantly smaller extent for people with different RA levels. 
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3.4 Path Selection 
There is a common feature among a large body of thinking theories in the 
psychology fields: "dual-process models" of thinking. To be specific, thinking involves 
two systems through which individuals were oriented in decision-making (Norman et al., 
2017). The faster system Type 1, is automatic, unconscious, and seemingly effortless, 
whereas the slower system, Type 2, is controlled, conscious, and effortful. As Evans 
and Stanovich (2013) described it, Type 1 is "intuitive, heuristic," and Type 2 is 
"reflective, analytic." 
In the marketing research area, correspondingly, the ELM (Elaboration Likelihood 
Model) among DMM (Dual-process models) is based on a similar theory: two distinct 
routes while processing the information. Systematic or central route with high effort 
input and more cognitive thoughts, as well as a heuristic or peripheral route which is 
less effortful and more affective. 
Notably, Imagery and analyzing are complementary information processing 
modes (Oliver, Robertson, & Mitchell, 1993), rather than mutually exclusive processes 
(McInnis & Price, 1987). These correspond to the encoding of pictures as imagine 
codes and words as verbal codes in memory (Unnava & Burnkrant, 1991). It means that 
processing the information is not exclusively imagery or analyzing. To be specific, it 
could contain both cognitive thoughts and affect but in different proportions. Similarly, 
Sojka and Giese (1997) had classified the individuals according to their processing style 
to four types: Feeling processors (high affect and low cognition), passive processors 
(low affect and low cognition), combination processors (high affect and high cognition), 
and thinking processors (low affect and high cognition). 
Imagery is based on sensorial, non-verbal representations, while analyzing relies 
more on semantic processing (Childers, Heckler, & Houston, 1986) and holistic 
(Thompson & Hamilton, 2006). Analytical processing is semantic and uses reasoned 
processing. This style of reasoning was regarded as more controlled (Stanovich & 
West, 2000), deliberate and slow (Tversky & Kahneman, 1989). 
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In comparative advertising, it is often found that systematic cues and heuristic 
(peripheral) cues emerge simultaneously. To help explain detailed quality of products 
(systematic cues) which might be complicated for consumers to understand in a limited 
exposure, marketers sometimes rely on communicating with consumers' emotions 
through heuristic or peripheral cues (which generally involve contextual factors 
irrelevant to an argument's quality). Interestingly, according to previous research, 
attribute information is better recalled when it was presented both as a picture and in 
words than when it was presented only as words with a different attribute conveyed in 
the picture (Houston, Childers, & Heckler, 1987; Unnava & Burnkrant, 1991). 
According to previous research (Alter et al., 2007), metacognitive difficulty 
activates analytic reasoning, which means under the situation of metacognitive difficulty, 
people are more heavily influenced by the systematic cue than in the ease condition. 
Besides, generally speaking, people with high NFC are more curious and enjoy thinking, 
they are naturally expected to rely on systematic cues than on hedonic cues when 
making decisions. With additional stimulus evoking analytical thinking, people with high 
NFC should have an outstanding preference in analytical processing path compared 
with low NFC people who are 'cognitive miser'. On the other hand, for people with low 
NFC, metacognitive ease provides them with a fluent environment to make decisions 
instinctively and emotionally with less effort, while metacognitive difficulty functions as 
an obstacle which makes them feel curious and hinder them from imagery processing 
path more or less. Thus, here I want to detect whether different metacognitive 
experiences could have further influence on the preference for the information 
processing path in the comparative ads among people at all NFC levels. 
H8 (a): For people with a high NFC level, their preference on choosing analytical 
processing path is higher under metacognitive difficult condition than those in 
metacognitive ease condition because of higher reliance on systematic cues than 
heuristic ones. 
H8 (b): For people with a low NFC level, there is no difference on the preference on 
analytical processing path. 
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H9 (a): For people with a low NFC level, their preference on choosing imagery 
processing path is higher under metacognitive ease condition than those in 
metacognitive difficulty condition because of higher reliance on heuristic cues than 
systematic ones. 
H9 (b): For people with a high NFC level, there is no difference on the preference on 
imagery processing path. 
 
4.0 Study 1 
4.1 Methodology 
4.1.1 Experimental Task 
The goal of experiment 1 is to test H1-H6; According to the literature review 
mentioned above, the CRM effects only function well under systematic path processing 
(Meyers-Levy & Peracchio, 1995). To create a stimulus that could effectively impose 
subjects to put proper cognitive effort to process the information, I decided to create a 
comparative ad containing both a heuristic cue (picture) and a systematic cue (Text). 
The systematic cue should be related to important features of the products which could 
appeal to the subjects to engage in effortful thinking. As for the heuristic cue, it should 
be neutral and pale so that the viewers will not be too impressed and distracted from the 
text reading, avoiding making decisions based on their intuition and emotion. 
4.1.2 Stimuli Selection 
4.1.2.1 Choosing of Products 
Considering the sensitivity of metacognitive difficulty in the product's domain 
(Pocheptsova, Labroo, & Dhar, 2010), a pretest was conducted to choose the products. 
Among 6 common products (Liquid laundry detergent; Toothpaste; Shampoo; Home 
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audio; Headphone; Refrigerator; Sedan), the product which receives an average score 
between "unique, exclusive or uncommon" and "daily, familiar or common" will be my 
stimulus. It judged by product involvement (using a 7-point, 6-item semantic differential 
scale: relevant to me/not relevant to me, important/not important, of no concern to me/of 
concern to me, matters to me/doesn't matter to me, involving/not involving, means a lot 
to me/means nothing to me) and prior product knowledge (using a 7-point, 3-item 
semantic differential scale: very knowledgeable/not knowledgeable at all, familiar/not 
familiar, and experienced in using it/ not experienced in using it) (Kirk 2008) to reduce 
the effect of potential covariates. The score on the two scales was averaged for 
selection. 
4.1.2.2 Heuristic cues 
According to Kahneman and Frederick(2002), attribute substitution, one type of 
the heuristic model, has "The Beautiful-Is-Familiar" effect (e.g., attractive faces are 
more likely to be mistakenly labeled as the familiar and more positive effect will be 
recalled, Monin & Oppenheimer, 2005). In comparative advertisements, a common way 
to create a strong heuristic condition is to improve the competence of target products' 
appearance while diminishing the attractiveness of competitive products. Different from 
using the strong or weak physical appearance of competence to constitute heuristic 
cues as in many other experiments, here I decided to create a neutral, unimpressive 
comparison between the appearance of the targeted product and the anonymous 
competitive product to represent the weak heuristic cue (which is more practical among 
comparative ads). The attractiveness of targeted products will be rated, and the ads 
with insignificant contrast between the target product and competitive product will be 
defined as a weak heuristic cue. 
4.1.2.3 Systematic cues 
As Alter et al. did in 2007, participants reported the three most important and the 
three least important features of targeted products to construct the systematic cue. In 
my pretest, the strength of the systematic cue will be manipulated by using the three 
21 
 
most commonly mentioned important features. After choosing targeted products, I will 
give several common features of the products, and ask subjects to give the sequence of 
these features from most important to least important to filter effective systematic cues. 
4.1.3 Difficulty Assessment 
Whether the difference between Metacognitive difficulty and ease in the ads are 
significant enough to be served as a cue should be checked. Only when the 
manipulation of metacognitive difficulty indeed incurs different levels of resource 
requirement (RR), assumptions in the CRM can be tested. The trick to manipulating the 
metacognitive difficulty in this experiment was to use the faint, obscure and distorted 
font of masthead and introduction of products which is harder to process than clear one 
on the ads (Labroo & Dhar, 2010; Labroo & Kim, 2009; Lee & Shavitt, 2009; Alter et al., 
2007). However, this time, only the masthead of the ads will be handled to create a 
feeling of difficulty, while the text of systematic and heuristic cue will remain the same in 
every condition to avoid covariate in processing the content of the ads. H1 (Meta-
cognitive difficulty implies a high level of RR because more efforts are expected to 
devote to understanding the message. On the contrary, Meta-cognitive ease is less 
resource demanding (lower level of RR)) will be tested in this manipulation check and 
the main test could be continued based on it. 
4.1.4 Dependent & independent measures 
Persuasion (DV) 
Persuasion will be measured by 4 items with 7-point scales (from not at all=1 to 
extreme amount=7) (Block & Keller, 1997): 1. How worthwhile you think driving the 
recommended model of the sedan would be to you personally as a way to do 
transportation? 2. How convincing do you think the ad is? 3. How effective do you think 
the content of the ad would be in persuading someone to purchase the recommended 
model of the sedan rather than other brands of sedans? 4. How interested would you be 




RA will be measured by 5-item message attention as in Laczniak and Muehling 
(1993): 1. How much attention did you pay to the ad? 2. How much did you notice the 
information in the ad? 3. How much did you concentrate on the information in the ad? 4. 
How involved were you with the information in the ad? 5. How much thought did you put 
into evaluating the information in the ad? 
NFC (IV) 
We used the 6-items form (Gabriel & Paul, 2018) to measure the NFC level of 
subjects instead of the 18-items full form for NFC (to shorten the length of the 
questionnaire) (as shown in Table 3). 
Different from other studies manipulating resource allocation before viewing the 
ads, such as assigning tasks with different levels of vulnerability to subjects for 
distinguishing different levels of RA groups (Keller & Block, 1997), or varying the initial 
experimental instructions (from imaging themselves 'in the comfort of their living room' 
to 'in the market to choose among brands') (Keith & Girish, 2004), it is worth to notice 
that my experiments measure the RA after subjects are viewing the ads. On the one 
hand, because in my model, I will detect the mediator effect of RA between NFC and 
persuasion, and manipulation in advance could have covariate effects on how the 
mediator works. On the other hand, subjects can only decide how much cognitive effort 
to be allocated to process information after they recognize the task (Kanfer & 
Ackerman, 1989). The differences of the masthead can only have effects on RR but not 
on RA because the content of the information is the same. Besides, until now, there is 
no previous research that shows that the change of font would influence RA. 
4.1.5 Sample characteristics and testing procedure 
For the pretest and pilot study, 20, 60 and 40 subjects were hired from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk online separately to find suitable stimuli including product, heuristic 
and systematic cues, and difficulty assessment. 
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Then, through Amazon Mechanical Turk online, 200 people participated and they 
are assigned to two conditions separately (100 in each condition). In each condition, the 
subjects will first view an ad, and then related dependent and independent variables will 
be measured. 
In the first condition, the masthead of the ads will be written in an easy-to-read 
typeset to create a metacognitive ease environment. In the second condition, the 
masthead of the ads will be written in a difficult-to-read typeset to create a 
metacognitive difficult environment. As for the content of the ad, both conditions include 
the same positive systematic cue and neutral heuristic cue.  
First, Familiarity and Involvement of the products were measured with the 
measurements used in the pretest of choosing products which could be used to reduce 
the covariance in data analysis. Then, participants will see the appearance of the 
advertised product with similar attractiveness compared to that of an anonymous one, 
paired with important features of the advertised product, encouraging subjects to 
engage in effortful thinking. After reading the ads, persuasion, RA and NFC are 
measured sequentially. 
4.1.6 Analysis Overview 
First, the Reliability of each measurement is tested to see if it is good enough. 
And then, the mediator effects of RA between NFC and persuasion is checked. After 
that, the interaction between RA and metacognitive experience is checked to see 
whether the match of RR and RA level could have an influence on persuasion. The last 
step is to check if NFC could directly have an interaction with Metacognitive difficulty 




4.2 Pre-test and Pilot Study 
Choosing of products 
20 subjects view 6 common products (Liquid laundry detergent; Toothpaste; 
Shampoo; Home audio; Headphone; Refrigerator; Sedan) and give their review 
sequentially. As a result, shown in Table 1, Sedan (M=3.58, SD=1.47) and Laundry 
Detergent (M=2.9, SD=0.83) which have average performance on involvement and prior 
product knowledge were chosen to be used as two stimuli separately in study 1 and 
study 2. 
Heuristic Cue 
After deciding to use sedan as a stimulus product, 60 subjects participated in a 
pretest to find heuristic cues. They were randomly exposed to one of the three pictures 
(Figure 3), and rate "how much you like the car on the left side of the ad/ how much do 
you like the car on the right side of the ad" on a 7-Likert scale. (3 samples were invalid 
and removed, only 57 responses were used in the analysis). 
As expected, in Figure 3-1, two sedans which occupied equal width and had the 
same backgrounds in the ad received similar preference (M_white=5.11, SD=1.32; 
M_grey=5.16, SD=1.54), t (34) =-0.116, sig (2-tail) = 0.91 >0.1. While in Figure 3-2, the 
white sedan which was highlighted by occupying more space and having a bright 
background received significantly more preference (M=5.41, SD=1.13) than did the grey 
one (M=4.68, SD=1.62), t (42) =-1.747, sig (2-tail) = 0.088 < 0.1. In Figure 3-3, the place 
of the white and grey sedan was exchanged to make sure that it was the manipulation 
of width and backgrounds that had an effect. As a result, the grey sedan which was 
highlighted this time indeed received more preference (M=5.94, SD=0.827) than did the 
white one (M=4.71, SD=1.90), t (32) =-2.462, sig (2-tail) = 0.019 < 0.05. 
These results showed that the manipulation on the background of products 
creates the heuristic cue that functioned very well in manipulating the favourability. Thus 
Figure 1-1 was chosen to be a weak heuristic cue and will be used in the design of ads. 
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As for Figure 1-2 and 1-3, although it is very popular to create such a comparison 
among real-life scenarios, they will be abandoned in this experiment because they could 
significantly improve the subjects' favourability without any analytical thinking.  
Systematic Cue 
In this pretest, 9 common features of the sedan (Table 2-1) written in different 
text boxes were provided to 57 subjects in online questionnaires. They were asked to 
drag the boxes to rank them from "most important (1)" to "least important (9)" and then 
features got the score which was equal to their rank individually. In Table 2-2, the 
average score of each feature was compared. As results, the strong systematic cues 
were: Exterior Design, GD Engine, and Solidity. Thus these three features, which were 
weighty and professional enough to induce subjects' high involvement, will be used 
appropriately as systematic cues in the ads. 
Difficulty Assessment 
After the pretest for products, heuristic and systematic cues, the design of the 
ads came out: A review of Sedan in a car magazine shown in Figure 4. Figure 4-1 and 
Figure 4-2, which had the same content but a different font of the masthead, were 
viewed by 40 participants (20 in each cell). As expected, the disfluent masthead was 
considered more difficult to read (M =2.65, SD =0.81) than the fluent masthead 
(M=1.85, SD =1.31), sig (2-tailed) =0.026 < 0.05. What's more, exposure to the easy to 
process version resulted in greater cognitive thoughts (M=1.55, SD=0.67) than the 
difficult one (M=1.10, SD=0.85), sig (2-tailed) = 0.074 < 0.1. That means, the easy 
version incurring more cognitive thoughts was presumed to require less resource 
requirement (Keith, 2004), and thus created a meta-cognitive ease experience. 
Hypothesis 1 that metacognitive difficulty implies a high level of RR because 
more efforts are expected to devote to understanding the message was supported here. 
And thus the main test could be continued based on the successful manipulation. 
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4.3 Mains Study 
4.3.1 Reliability 
Reliability for all measurements of variables (All of them have high enough 
Cronbach's Alpha, as shown in Table 4). The results showed that the reliability of all the 
measurement of variables is good enough (between .821 and .964). 
4.3.2 Mediator effects of RA 
At first, I examined whether RA could be a mediator between NFC and 
persuasion. I analyzed the data with SPSS. In Hayes' process, I found the model 4 for 
detecting mediators that match my demand. The means of NFC, RA, and Persuasion 
were entered, and the results are showed in Table 5. 
The direct path from NFC to persuasion is marginally significant (b=-.0435, 
s.e.=.0480, p=.0512); however, the coefficient between NFC and RA (b=.1990, 
s.e.=.0647) is significant (p=.0024) and the path from RA to persuasion is also 
significant (b=.2784, s.e.=.0517 , p=.0000). The indirect effects of NFC on persuasion 
through RA exists (BootLLCI = .0171, BootULCI = .1027, under 95% level of 
confidence). 
H2 that High Need for Cognition implies a high level of RA through enhancing the 
motivation of processing (Low Need for Cognition implies a low level of RA) is 
supported here. RA acted as a mediator between NFC and Persuasion. 
4.3.3 Interaction between RA and metacognitive experience 
As for the interaction between RA and metacognitive experience, to detect a 
more specific tendency about how the matching model affects the persuasion, RA was 
separated into three levels according to its frequency of scores. For subjects whose 
mean From 2.20 to 5.40 (account for 32.3% of whole subjects) were set as low RA 
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group, those from 5.60 to 6.40 (34.5%) were set as middle RA group, and those from 
6.60 to 7.00 (33.2%) were set as high RA group. 
A two-way ANOVA was conducted that examined the effect of RA level and 
metacognitive experience level on persuasion. There was a statistically significant 
interaction between the effects of RA and metacognitive experience on persuasion 
(Table 6-1), F (2,192) =3.938, p=.021. Simple main effects analysis showed that people 
with different RA levels performed significantly different on persuasion (p=.000), but 
there was no significant difference (p=.491) between metacognitive ease and difficulty 
when RA level is controlled. 
However, the specific trend needs further exploration. According to simple t-tests 
based on the descriptive statistics (Table 6-2), I can find the specific trend of influences 
on persuasion with the help of the plot of estimated marginal means (Figure 5). 
According to Table 6-3, when RA is low, the persuasion of metacognitive difficulty is 
significantly lower than that of metacognitive ease (p=.0326). When RA is at the middle 
level, the effects of difficulty and ease on persuasion are similar (p=.7134). When RA 
reached a high level, the persuasion of difficulty increased largely and significantly 
exceeded that of ease of persuasion (p=.0522). 
Under the metacognitive ease condition, the persuasion increases significantly 
from low RA to middle RA level (p=.0028). However, it stopped increasing when RA 
increased from mid to high level (p=.8564). While under the metacognitive difficulty 
condition, the persuasion keeps increasing from low RA to middle RA (p=.000) and from 
middle RA to high RA (p=.0176). 
According to Keller and Block (1997) (Figure 1), when RA=RR, the persuasion 
reaches the peak in the graph. If the stimulus of metacognitive ease is designed 
properly, usually there will be an inverted U under meta-cognitive ease condition. That 
is because at the starting point and endpoint of RA, RR will be larger or smaller than 
RA, but RR will equal to RA in the middle of the horizontal axis. 
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However, in my line chart, the ideal inverted U didn't appear, but it doesn't mean 
the resource matching model didn't exist and the theory is invalid. When RA is low, ease 
condition has lower level of RR compared to Difficulty condition, which is closer to low 
RA level, thus its persuasion is higher; however, with the increase of RA level, the high 
RR in difficulty condition is closer to high RA level compared to low RR in ease 
condition; thus the persuasion in difficulty condition is higher. These correspond to the 
previous matching theory. 
The reason why we didn't get an inverted U shape of persuasion in ease 
condition, is because the RR level of the ease condition is not low enough that the 
condition of RA > RR didn't appear. As I mentioned before, level 2 and level 3 of the 
persuasion are similar in ease condition, it means the RA reaches to the equal level of 
RR earlier than the RA did in difficulty condition. 
In sum, the H3 (a) that when metacognitive experience is difficult, the persuasion 
will keep improving with the increased level of RA because the RA level is getting close 
to the RR level, and H3 (b) that when metacognitive experience is ease, the persuasion 
will experience an improvement first, then reach a peak at the mid-level of RA, and stop 
improving or even decrease with the increase of RA, were supported here. But their 
existence had a prerequisite that the subjects must be under systematic message 
processing. 
4.3.4 Interaction between NFC and metacognitive experience 
The groups of NFC were split in the same way as in RA. Subjects' scores from 
1.00 to 3.00 (33%) were set as low NFC group, those from 3.17 to 3.83 (34%) were set 
as middle NFC group, and those from 4.00 to 5.00 (33%) were set as high NFC group. 
Only low and high levels of NFC were kept to simplify the explanation of results. 
The interaction between NFC (low/high) and Metacognitive experience 
(ease/difficulty) is also analyzed with two-way ANOVA (Table 7). There was no 
statistically significant interaction between the effects of NFC and metacognitive 
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experience on persuasion, F (1,126) =2.094, p=.150. Besides, the main effects of NFC 
(p=.434) and metacognitive experience (p=.766) were also not significant. 
H4 and H5 couldn't be supported here because no interaction was found. But it is 
in accordance with my expectation considering that the stimulus in this experiment was 
designed to evoke systematic and resource-intensive processing, we can not deduce 
that the effect in H4 and H5 will not function in resource-moderate processing with a 
general stimulus which is possible to arouse systematic or heuristic processing path 
according to individual differences. 
Thus, the study 2 will need to be deducted to solve the problem: the strength of 
systematic and heuristic cues in the ad should be designed roughly to the same level; 
thus people with different NFC levels could make their judgment on devoting how many 
efforts on cues and have possibilities in engaging different information processing 
paths. The H4 and H5 will be tested under this condition. Considering that CRM would 
not function well under the design of stimulus, I assume that RA might not work as a 
mediator and there will be no interaction of RR and RA levels on persuasion. At the 
same time, H6 will also be checked by keeping the strength of systematic and heuristic 
cues in the same level which help capture the effects of metacognitive experience on 
the choice of the information processing path for people in different NFC, avoiding the 
appearance of any other covariate related to the inconsistent of the strength and 
content of cues. At last, ad evaluation will also be measured in experiment 2 to see 
whether H7, H8 and H9 are supported or not. 
5.0 Study 2 
5.1 Methodology 
5.1.1 Experimental Task 
Study 2 was conducted to check the hypothesis related to ICA under DMM. 
Different from study 1 in which the stimuli were designed to encourage systematic and 
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resource-intensive processing, study 2 created an environment that evoke resource-
moderate processing and aroused systematic or heuristic processing path compatibility. 
In Study 2, the strength of systematic and heuristic cues in the ad was designed 
roughly to the same level, thus people with different NFC levels could make their 
judgment on devoting how much efforts on cues and have possibilities in engaging 
different information processing paths. Considering that CRM would not function well 
under the design of stimulus, I assume that RA might not work as a mediator and there 
will be no interaction of RR and RA levels on persuasion, and thus that H3 will not be 
supported here. While the H4 and H5 which are not supported in study 1 will be 
detected under this condition. At the same time, H9 will also be checked by keeping the 
strength of systematic and heuristic cues at the same level which helps capture the 
effects of metacognitive experience on the choice of information processing path for 
people in different NFC, avoiding the appearance of any other covariate related to the 
inconsistent of the strength and content of cues. At last, ad evaluation was measured in 
experiment 2 to see whether H6, H7, and H8 are supported or not. 
5.1.2 Stimuli Selection 
The heuristic cue and systematic cue in experiment 2 will be kept at the same 
level of strength. No matter what cue people rely on, the content and strength of the cue 
should be as close as possible to each other and the only difference is the form: 
heuristic or systematic. Thus the attitude and purchase intention are comparable without 
considering the covariate related to different contents or figures between the cues. 
The product this time was laundry detergent. Two forms of cues were designed. 
For the systematic cue, there was a paragraph of text which describes 4 advantages of 
the detergent compared to leading bargain liquid detergent brand (based variant). For 




The meta-cognitive difficulty was manipulated by the obscure and distorted font 
of the masthead, the faint font of the introduction of products, and blur form of pictures 
which is harder to process than the clear one in the ads.  
5.1.3 Difficulty Assessment 
The manipulation of metacognitive difficulty and the strength of the cues were 
checked together in a questionnaire containing 4 versions of ads (Figure 6) 
(Metacognitive Ease and Metacognitive difficulty in a text version ad individually; 
Metacognitive Ease and Metacognitive difficulty in a picture version ad individually). The 
goal of the manipulation check is to see whether the strengths of heuristic and 
systematic cue are similar, and whether the difference between metacognitive difficulty 
and metacognitive ease is significant. 
5.1.4 Dependent & independent measures 
Need For Cognition (IV) 
The 6-item measurement of NFC is used here, the same as in experiment 1. 
Resource Availability (IV) 
We use the same measurements in experiment 1 for RA   
Persuasion (DV) 
The measurements of message persuasiveness are from Thompson and 
Hamilton (2006). It is measured again here but on a shorter scale compared to 
experiment 1. Participants are asked to rate the message as being not persuasive/ 




Attitude assessment (DV) 
Attitude is measured through three dimensions: attitude towards ads (Did the Ads 
for 'Superb Detergent' make you feel bad/good, pleasant/unpleasant, 
favorable/unfavorable, worthless/valuable, and not interesting/interesting; Thompson & 
Hamilton, 2006); Attitude towards brand (Please describe your overall feelings about the 
brand described in the ad you just read: Unappealing/appealing, bad/good, 
unpleasant/pleasant, unfavorable/favorable, unlikable/likable; Spears & Singh, 2004) 
and purchase intention (Assuming the products were available in their area: 1. How 
likely are you to buy the product of 'Superb' in the ads the next time you shop for the 
laundry detergent? 2. How likely are you to consider the product of 'Superb' the next 
time you shop for laundry detergent? 3. How likely are you to recommend to someone 
else the 'Superb' laundry detergent? From 'Very unlikely' to 'Very likely') with a 7-Likert 
scale. 
Attitude Certainty (DV) 
Certainty will be measured by a 7-item scale developed by Petrocelli et al. 
(2007). Two dimensions of attitude certainty will be captured: attitude clarity and attitude 
correctness. The specific items will be modified a little bit to adapt to the ads. 
Clarity: 1. How certain are you that you know what your true attitude on this 
brand of detergent is? 2. How certain are you that the attitude you just expressed 
toward the laundry detergent reflects your true thoughts and feelings? 3. To what extent 
is your true attitude clear in your mind about the product? 
Correctness: 1. How certain are you that your attitude toward the product is the 
correct attitude to have? 2. To what extent do you think other people should have the 
same attitude as you on this product? 3. How certain are you that of all the possible 
attitudes one might have toward this brand of detergent, your attitude reflects the right 
way to think and feel about it? 
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Path Choosing (DV) 
The extent to which they engaged in imagery and analytical information 
processing. Two groups of questions will be asked (Thompson & Hamilton, 2006; 
Petrova & Cialdini, 2005). 
Imagery processing: 1. I tried to form a picture of the product; 2. I imagined 
myself using the detergent in the ad to do laundry (Keller & McGill, 1994). 3. My 
evaluation was based on personal impressions and feelings. (Not very much=1 to a 
great deal=7). 
Analytical processing: 1. I tried to use as much information about the product 
features as possible to evaluate it. 2. I evaluated the laundry detergent feature by 
feature rather than evaluating it as a whole. 3. My evaluations were based on careful 
thinking and reasoning. (Strongly disagree=1 to strongly agree=7). 
5.1.5 Sample Characteristics and testing procedure 
Through Amazon Mechanical Turk online, 288 subjects were hired to participate 
in this experiment. Half of them exposed to a metacognitive ease version and half of 
them exposed to a metacognitive difficulty version. 
Familiarity and involvement of the laundry detergent were measured beforehand 
to reduce covariance in data analysis. Then they would view one of the two versions of 
ads. After that, RA, persuasion, attitude assessment, attitude certainty and path 
choosing preference, and NFC were collected sequentially. 
5.1.6 Analysis Overview 
First, the Reliability of each measurement were tested to check if each 
measurement is reliable. After that, the interaction of NFC and Metacognitive 
Experience on ad evaluation were analyzed. Besides, whether the Metacognitive 
Experience and RA have an interaction on attitude certainty were explored. The last 
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analysis was how the Metacognitive and NFC have effects on processing path 
choosing. 
5.2 Pre-test and Pilot Study 
240 subjects online from Amazon Turk viewed one of four versions of ads 
randomly. 60 participants in each cell were asked to read the ads and rate the difficulty 
by three, 5 point scales items (Alter et al., 2007): 1. From your point of view, reading the 
Masthead of the ad is (extremely easy - Extremely difficult); 2.How difficult for you to 
understand the ads? (Extremely easy-Extremely difficult); 3. How much effort you 
expected to have to expend to understand the ad (None at all - A great deal). 
In the Text version (Figure 6-1, Figure 6-3), as expected, the fluency 
manipulation check showed that the disfluent masthead was considered more difficult to 
read (M =2.75, SD =1.28) than the fluent masthead (M=1.65, SD =0.73), p=0.000. The 
disfluent description was also considered more difficult to understand (M =3.05, SD 
=1.24) than the fluent description (M =2.65, SD =1.16), p=0.071 <0.1. More importantly, 
participants in the meta-cognitive difficulty cell indeed expected to spend more cognitive 
effort to understand the whole ad (M=2.28, SD=1.02) than did those in the fluent cell 
(M=1.88, SD=0.90), p=0.025 < 0.05. 
In the Picture version (Figure 6-2, Figure 6-4), the results are similar to the Text 
one. Participants thought the disfluent masthead was harder to process (M =2.43, SD 
=1.24) than the fluent one (M=1.72, SD =0.76), p=0.000. They also thought the disfluent 
description was more difficult to understand (M =3.13, SD =1.16) than the fluent 
description (M =2.67, SD =1.34), p= 0.043 <0.05. What's more, more cognitive efforts 
were expected to be spent on the ads with the metacognitive difficulty (M=2.23, 
SD=1.11) than on the ease one (M=1.72, SD=0.87), p =0.005 < 0.05. 
In the metacognitive ease version, the difficulty of understanding for the Picture 
version (M=1.72, SD=0.87) is not significant different from the Text version (M=1.88, 
SD=0.90), p = 0.304>0.1; And the effort spent on the picture version (M= 2.67, 
SD=1.34 ) is also not different from the Text version (M=2.65, SD=1.16 ), p = 0.94 > 0.1; 
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At the same time, in the meta-cognitive difficulty version, there was also no difference 
between text and picture versions, considering the difficulty of understanding and the 
efforts to be spent. The Picture version (M=2.23, SD=1.11) is similar to the Text version 
(M=2.28, SD=1.03), p = 0.798 > 0.1. For the effort, people spent similar energy on the 
Picture version (M=3.13, SD=1.15) is similar to the Text version (M=3.05, SD=1.24), p = 
0.704 > 0.1. 
In sum, the way of using faint, twisted font of text and blurred pictures were very 
successful to increase meta-cognitive difficulty, and the design of heuristic cue and 
systematic cue were also successful to contain equal strength because of the content 
which has similar difficulty levels and effort requirements. As a result, the final version of 
the stimulus was the combination of text and picture in the metacognitive difficulty 
version and ease version separately (Figure 4). 
After that, 60 people were engaged in the final version of the pretest. Half of them 
viewed the full version which contains heuristic cue and systematic cue under 
metacognitive ease condition (Figure 7-1). And 30 left viewed the ads of meta-cognitive 
difficulty (Figure 7-2). As expected, the disfluent masthead was considered more difficult 
to read (M =2.67, SD =1.18) than the fluent masthead (M=1.67, SD =0.76), p =0.000. 
The disfluent content was also considered more difficult to understand (M =2.23, SD 
=1.07) than the fluent description (M =1.57, SD =0.73), p =0.07 <0.1. More importantly, 
participants in the meta-cognitive difficulty cell indeed expected to spend more cognitive 
effort to understand the whole ad (M=3.13, SD=1.07) than did those in the fluent cell 
(M=2.57, SD=1.25), p =0.065 < 0.1. It implied that my manipulation is successful. 
5.3 Mains Study 
5.3.1 Ads evaluation 
For the reliability for the measurements of variables (All of them have high 
enough Cronbach's Alpha, as shown in Table 8-1), the results showed that all of them 
are good enough (between .738 and .963), except the measurement for analytical 
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processing (Cronbach's Alpha = .488, items =3). By removing the second item of this 
measurement (Table 8-2), I get an acceptable Cronbach's Alpha (.555). Thus for 
measuring the analytical processing, only two items are kept for data analysis. 
288 subjects participated in this experiment. Half of them were exposed to a 
metacognitive ease version and half of them were exposed to a metacognitive difficulty 
version. Model 15 in Hayes' process was used to detect whether RA could work as a 
mediator between NFC and persuasion and whether metacognitive experience can be a 
moderator and have interaction with RA and NFC on persuasion (Table 9). The effects 
of NFC on RA is not significant (p=.2351), and the indirect effect of NFC on persuasion 
through RA is also not significant (under metacognitive experience ease condition, 
BootLLCI = -.0086, BootULCI = 0.0422; under the difficulty condition, BootLLCI=-.0134, 
BootULCI=.0672); 
However, the direct effects of NFC on Persuasion is significant (coeff =.3065; 
S.E=.1391; p=.0284<0.05), and the interaction between NFC and metacognitive 
experience is significant (coeff = -.1966, S.E=.0856; p= .022<0.05). The result is as I 
expected. The RA in the CRM cannot work anymore in a moderate effort of processing. 
However, the NFC and metacognitive experience show their effects on persuasion. 
For further exploring whether the interaction between NFC and metacognitive 
experience could have influences on ad evaluations, a MANOVA was conducted (Table 
10). The groups of NFC were split as the way study 1 did. Subjects' scores from 1.00 to 
3.17 (31.6%) were set as low NFC group, those from 3.33 to 3.83 (30.9%) were set as 
middle NFC group, and those from 4.00 to 5.00 (37.5%) were set as high NFC group. 
Only low and high levels of NFC were kept in order to simplify the explanation of results. 
Removing the level 2 of NFC, the multivariate result of all ad attitude, certainty, 
persuasion were listed below: Wilks' Lamba (Table 10-1) : Sig: NFC (.025); 
Metacognitive experience (.062); interaction for NFC * Metacognitive experience (.298); 
p-value of 'Between subjects effects' test (Table 10-2): 'Need for cognition' effect on 
persuasion (.941), attitude toward ads (.374), attitude toward brands (.155), certainty 
(.010), purchase intention (.354); 'Metacognitive experience' effect on persuasion (.052), 
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attitude toward ads (.011), attitude toward brands (.004), certainty (.789), purchase 
intention (.011); Interaction of 'Metacognitive experience' and 'NFC' effect on persuasion 
(.039), attitude toward ads (.023), attitude toward brands (.036), certainty (.175), 
purchase intention (.055). 
We can conclude that except for 'certainty' (Figure 8-4), persuasion and other ad 
evaluation were affected by the interaction. According to the plots of estimated marginal 
means (Figure 8-1), I find that when NFC is low, persuasion is similar no matter the 
ease or difficult metacognitive experience. However, when the NFC is high, persuasion 
on the ease condition increases, while the persuasion score decreases on the difficult 
condition. That is because meta-cognitive experience invokes critical thinking and 
people in high NFC become more curious towards the content of the ads, thus the 
persuasion score decreases, which also transmit the effects to other ad evaluations. 
H4b and H5 were supported here, and H4a is not supported.  
According to Figure 8-2, 8-3, and 8-5, similar patterns were found on ad attitude 
and purchase intention. To sum up, the H6b (For people with high NFC, there will be a 
more negative attitude of ads/brands and purchase intention toward metacognitive 
difficulty for people with high NFC) is supported; and H6c (The difference of mean 
attitude of ads/brands and purchase intention will be larger between ease and difficult 
condition, compared to people with low NFC) is supported. While H6a is not supported.  
5.3.2 Certainty and RA 
However, although certainty is not affected by the interaction of NFC and 
metacognitive experience, the interaction of RA and Metacognitive experience was 
found that it has effects on certainty. 
RA was separated into 3 levels according to the frequency of the values as study 
1 did. For subjects' values falling between 2.2 and 5.4 (32.2%), they were assigned to 
low RA. Those between 5.6 to 6.2 were assigned to middle RA, and those between 6.4 
and 7.00 were assigned to high RA. 
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An ANOVA was conducted to explore the relationship between RA, 
metacognitive experience and certainty. Subjects belonging to Mid RA were removed 
and only those belonging to Low RA and High RA were used in the analysis. According 
to the test of between-subjects effects (Table 11-1), although the main effects of 
metacognitive experience is not significant (p = .702), the main effects of RA on 
certainty is significant (p = .000), and the interaction is significant too (p = .022) 
For further explanation, simple t-tests based on the descriptive statistics (Table 
11-2) were conducted, and the plot of estimated marginal means was drawn (Figure 9). 
Based on Table 11-3, when RA increases from low to high, the difference of certainty 
between metacognitive difficulty and ease was marginally significant (p_low RA=.148, 
and p_high RA=.052). However, under metacognitive ease conditions, the certainty of 
people with high RA is significantly higher than those with low RA (p=.000). While under 
metacognitive difficulty conditions, when RA reached a high level, the certainty did not 
increase very significantly compared to that at low RA level (p=0.054), the difference is 
marginally significant. 
As a conclusion, H7 that the certainty will be strengthened with the increase of 
RA level under metacognitive ease conditions while the certainty would not change to 
the same extent for people with different RA levels under metacognitive difficulty was 
supported here, there is an interaction between RA and Metacognitive experience on 
certainty. 
5.3.3 Choosing of Processing Path 
Do the levels of NFC and Metacognitive experience have an interaction on the 
choosing of the path? We use 2 items: the imagery processing path and analytical 
processing path to measure how they process the information of ads. 
Again, ANOVA was used to explore the effects. For the imagery processing, 
according to Test of between-subjects effects (Table 12-1), the main effects and the 
interaction were not significant at all (metacognitive experience: sig=.077, NFC: p =.866; 
interaction between metacognitive experience and NFC: p = .952). 
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For the analytical processing (Table 13-1), only the main effect of NFC was 
significant (p=.000), while the main effect of metacognitive experience (p=.262) and 
interaction (p=.603) were not. To further explore, simple T-tests based on descriptive 
statistics (Table 13-2) were conducted and plot of marginal means was drawn (Figure 
11), and I find that people with low NFC always have significantly lower scores on 
analytical processing than those with high NFC, no matter if under metacognitive ease 
condition (p=.0008), or metacognitive difficult condition (p=.0108). 
As a result, unfortunately, the H8a and H9a were not supported: there is no 
interaction between NFC and Metacognitive Experience on choosing a processing path. 
To be specific, the metacognitive experience cannot work as a moderator to influence 
the preference on imagery or analytical processing path among people in different NFC. 
Thus H8b and H9b were supported as there is no difference on the preference on 
imagery or analytical processing path under any type of metacognitive experience. 
There are two possible reasons that could lead to insignificant results. I noticed 
that among 199 subjects (middle NFC level removed), for the measurement of analytical 
processing, the range of the score is from 3 to 7(7-Likert scale), Median is 6.0, and 
Mean value is 6.0201. It means the overall preference in analytical processing is 
distributed among a high level. As for imagery processing, the range is from 1 to 7(7-
Likert scale), Median is 5.0, and the Mean value is 4.8844. The preference for imagery 
processing seems in a normal distribution. The higher than normal reliance on analytical 
processing path among all NFC might due to the reason below: First, The Measurement 
of analytical processing is not good enough to capture the variable because the 
Cronbach's alpha is a bit low (.555). The data collected from not good enough internal 
consistency measurements might lead to inaccurate results. While it is also due to the 
sample size. Another possible reason for the higher than the normal distribution of the 
analytical scores maybe because of the design of the stimulus. 
Another explanation for the insignificant result might be attributed to the choosing 
of the attributes of the product in ads. Environmental friendly, cleaning power, color 
protection, and scent belonged to typical attributes of detergents that advocated by 
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most well-known brands in the category. For customers who are exposed to the ads 
focusing on typical attributes, they are more likely to choose an analytical processing 
path, as a 'piecemeal review' of product attributes were evoked (Sujan, 1985; Pillai & 
Godsmith, 2008). The incongruity to their beliefs raised while viewing the typical 
attributes in comparative ads, and thus leads to analytical analysis on each piece of 
information. While comparative ads focus on atypical attributes, which usually 
interpreted as a weak claim, benefits from fewer counterarguments and association 
effects that enhance imagination through association with leading well-known brands in 
comparative ads (Droge & Darmon, 1987; Pillai & Godsmith, 2008). 
Considering the typical attributes contained in my stimulus, I deduce that subjects 
were driven to engage in piecemeal information processing and generally have a higher 
level of analytical analysis. As a result, the manipulation of the metacognitive 
experience cannot function well to incite subjects to choose different processing paths, 
because the content of ads already drive subjects heading to analytical processing path 
although they view the metacognitive ease masthead at the beginning (which assumed 
to choose imagery processing path). 
6.0 General Discussion and Implications 
The key purpose of this sections is to summarise the findings and examine the insights 
with regards to the research conducted. This was based on the results and analysis 
conducted, which are discussed above. 
6.1 Theoretical Implications 
Previous literature available related to ICA is limited due to the better 
effectiveness of DCA while competing against specific competitor on specific featured 
attributes. There is a knowledge gap on how ICA could function well, based on popular 
persuasion models, considering its superiority on outcompeting overall competitors in 
the market. Besides, most of the previous research focused on how the positive or 
negative effects of metacognitive experience formed, or when the influence of 
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metacognitive experience appear in non-comparative advertisements, but none of them 
try to discuss the metacognitive experience under popular persuasion models, such as: 
what kind of factors could act as to engage in the information processing model and 
eventually affect products evaluation from different aspects? And whether individuals 
performed differently when they come across similar metacognitive experiences 
considering an individual's difference? 
Among the previous research, there are neither studies conducted with regards 
to metacognitive experience on comparative advertising areas, nor studies related to 
metacognitive experience conducted in a comparative advertising environment. 
Therefore, this thesis explored and examined whether the most popular persuasion 
model (DMM and CRM) can also function well in comparative advertising considering 
individual differences and Metacognitive experiences, which could give support to future 
research related to this direction. 
Based on the results of the experiment conducted, in the Indirect comparative 
advertising, the DMM model and CRM model function well under suitable processing 
situations (general processing or resource-intensive, systematic message processing) 
which could be manipulated by the content of the ads. And the individual difference 
(NFC) and Metacognitive experience, as situational factors, were specifically tested to 
explain how they have effects on persuasion, certainty, and ad evaluation in the two 
models through different ways. 
6.2 Managerial Implications 
Considering the advantages of ICA on competing overall competitors in the 
market rather than specific featured attributes, it is worth studying how to manipulate the 
ICA in metacognitive levels, considering individual difference, to improve 
persuasiveness and ad evaluations. The results could effectively help advertisers to 
make advertising strategies for improving brand overall impressions and further growing 
markets, especially for those in high context societies. 
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For example, it is popular for advertisers in high technology fields to increase the 
level of metacognitive difficulty, such as using complicated terms that can’t be 
understood at a glance, or create a curious and stressful atmosphere, building a unique 
and advanced brand impression compared to other competitors. This strategy might be 
very useful to stand out from other brands, but negative attitude will be also invoked for 
the audience with high NFC. However, people with Low NFC will not be affected. Under 
this condition, designing different types of ads for people with different level of NFC will 
become necessary for reaching the goal of transmitting appropriate brand impression 
without hurting the favorability.  
6.3 Limitations 
First of all, considering the different attitudes to indirect comparative advertising 
in high and low context society, the samples collected from the USA where indirect 
comparative advertising are less popular cannot represent the performance of ICA in 
high context societies, such as Asia or India. And although the participants are from 
American geographically, culture related questions can be added to distinguish which 
context culture they come from (low or high), because people from different context 
culture might act differently. Besides, the favorability of imagery stimuli and systematic 
stimuli should be checked under different metacognitive experiences to ensure the 
manipulation indeed evoke enough critical thinking and preference on systematic cue 
just like in Alters (2007). If the difficulty level is not high enough, preference on 
analytical processing might not happen. What’s more, the way to increase the difficulty 
of metacognitive experience in my experiment is to use faint, obscure fonts of text. 
Although it is a common way for manipulation in previous research, it is still not common 
in real life. A more popular and practical way to manipulate metacognitive difficulty is 
still a gap in the literature.  
The last limitation is related to sample size. The distribution in Need for Cognitive 
implied that the subjects in my sample seems to locate at a slightly higher level of NFC 
because of the large median score, thus the people classified to low level of NFC in my 
study actually should belong to a higher NFC level compared to those in real life. A 
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repeated experiment of large sample size containing subjects with normal distribution 
on NFC level should be conducted.  
6.4 Future Directions 
Several areas could be explored for future research in the given field. Features 
that has been fully explored in persuasion models could be taken into consideration 
under indirect comparative advertising to find its utilization on improving the 
effectiveness of ICA in the market. Newest advances and findings in metacognitive 
fields should be also given some thought. Additionally, a larger scale study with a larger 
sample size and more types of stimuli is necessary to provide more support to the 
conclusion in this study. At last, cross cultural factors such as high or low context culture 
can be add as individual difference to explore consumers’ reactions worldwide. 
7.0 Conclusion 
This thesis reveals insights into the metacognitive experience, Resource 
availability, Need for cognition, and their effect on persuasion, ad evaluation, and 
processing path choosing under Indirect comparative advertising. 
First, it built an apparent connection between resource requirement and 
metacognitive experience which has never been discussed in previous research, which 
always connected cognitive load with resource requirement. My study explored a new 
insight on cognitive resource matching theory at the metacognitive level: Metacognitive 
difficulty implies a high level of RR because more efforts are expected to be devoted to 
understand the message. 
Based on that, by creating a condition that evokes resource-intensive, systematic 
message processing and thus CRM seems to be applicable, my study use individual 
difference (NFC) as an effective way to manipulate RA, successfully prove that 
metacognitive features can also function well within a resource matching model, which 
is a gap in previous metacognitive research. 
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In addition, a general environment of Dual Mediation Model was also explored. 
We found that for people with high NFC, persuasion, attitude towards the ad, attitude 
towards the brand, and purchase intention are significantly higher in metacognitive ease 
conditions than difficulty conditions. However, for people with low NFC, the difference of 
persuasion between the metacognitive ease condition and difficulty condition is not 
significant. What’s more, certainty will be strengthened with the increase of RA level 
under metacognitive ease conditions, while the certainty would not change significantly 
for people with different RA levels under metacognitive difficulty. 
Unfortunately, no interaction between NFC and Metacognitive Experience on 
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Appendix A: Figures 
Figure 3: Heuristic cue (Pretest of Study 1) 
Figure 3-1: equal-level comparison 
 







Figure 3-3: Highlight grey sedan 
  
 














Figure 6 : Pilot test for study 2 









Figure 6-3: Text * Metacognitive Difficult Version 
 














Figure 8:  Interaction of NFC*Metacognitive experience 
Figure 8-1: NFC* Metacognitive Experience on Persuasion 
 
 




Figure 8-3: NFC* Metacognitive Experience on Attitude toward Brands 
 
 




Figure 8-5: NFC* Metacognitive Experience on Purchase Intention 
 
 




Figure 10: NFC * Metacognitive Experience on Imagery Analysis 
 
 




Appendix B: Tables 
Table 1: Pretest of study 1_Score of potential targeted products 





MEAN* 2.47 2.67 2.9 3.58 3.93 
SD 0.765 0.73 0.833 1.473 1.302 
N 20 20 20 20 20 
  
* Average score of potential targeted products on Involvement and Prior Product Knowledge 
 
Table 2: Pretest of study 1 _Features and its importance scores 
Table 2-1: Nine Common Features of the Sedan 
Exterior Design (eg: colour, shape) 
Interior Accessories (eg: glove box, multi-function cup holder, leather trim seats) 
Gas Diesel Engine (eg: horsepower, fuel efficiency, seamless acceleration) 
Quietness (eg: Dash Silencer; Acoustically insulated flooring) 




Interior High-Tech Equipment (eg: Electronic seat adjustment with memory function, Multi-zone climate 
systems) 
Electronic Safety System (eg: Lane Departure Alert, Blind Spot Monitor, Automatic emergency braking) 
Popularity (eg: one of the best-selling model among the sedan markets) 
Seat Space and Storage Space (eg: enough legroom, flexible split folding rear seats) 
 
Table 2-2: Mean value of the importance of feature 
  Exterior Design Interior 
Accessories 
GD Engine Quietness Solidity 
Mean* 3.62 4.67 4.30 5.58 4.30 








Mean* 5.40 4.75 7.30 5.09   
  
*the lower mean value, the higher importance of the feature. 
 
Table 3: NFC Scale-6 
The Very Efficient Assessment of Need for Cognition: Developing a Six-Item Version Gabriel Lins de Holanda Coelho
, Paul H. P. Hanel, Lukas J. Wolf (2018) 
01. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
02. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
03. Thinking is not my idea of fun. (R) 




11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does 
not require much thought. 
Table 4: Reliability for study 1 
 Cronbach’s Alpha N of items 
Familiarity .877 3 
Involvement .964 6 
Resource Availability .922 5 
Persuasion .821 4 
Need for cognition .896 6 
 
Table 5: Mediator effects of RA 
Run MATRIX procedure: 
***************** PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Version 3.4 ***************** 
          Written by Andrew F. Hayes, Ph.D.       www.afhayes.com 
    Documentation available in Hayes (2018). www.guilford.com/p/hayes3 
************************************************************************** 
Model  : 4 
    Y  : Persuasi 
    X  : NFC 
    M  : RA 
Covariates: 
 Fmlrty   Invlvmnt 
Sample 







          R       R-sq            MSE          F        df1            df2                p 
      .3584      .1285      .9618     9.6310     3.0000   196.0000      .0000 
 
Model 
                       coeff         se          t                   p       LLCI        ULCI 
constant     4.2559      .3205    13.2789      .0000     3.6238     4.8879 
NFC           .1990      .0647     3.0763      .0024      .0714      .3266 
Fmlrty        .0409      .0531      .7717      .4412     -.0637      .1456 






          R       R-sq            MSE          F               df1        df2            p 
      .5504      .3029      .5045    21.1813     4.0000   195.0000      .0000 
 
Model 
                       coeff         se          t              p           LLCI       ULCI 
constant     1.5780      .3199     4.9325      .0000      .9471     2.2090 
NFC          -.0435      .0480     -.9058      .3662     -.1381      .0512 
RA            .2784      .0517     5.3815      .0000      .1764      .3804 
Fmlrty       -.0655      .0385    -1.7010      .0905     -.1414      .0104 
Invlvmnt      .1998      .0348     5.7395      .0000      .1312      .2685 
 
****************** DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y ***************** 
Direct effect of X on Y 
     Effect         se               t              p       LLCI       ULCI 
     -.0435      .0480     -.9058      .3662     -.1381      .0512 
 
Indirect effect(s) of X on Y: 
       Effect     BootSE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
RA      .0554      .0220      .0171      .1027 
68 
 
*********************** ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS ************************ 
Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output: 
  95.0000 
Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals: 
  5000 
NOTE: Variables names longer than eight characters can produce incorrect output. 
      Shorter variable names are recommended. 
------ END MATRIX ----- 
 
Table 6: Two-way ANOVA of study 1 
Table 6-1: Tests of Between-Subjects effects 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
    
Dependent Variable:   Persuasion   
 
    
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 46.257a 7 6.608 13.374 .000 
Intercept 120.798 1 120.798 244.482 .000 
Fmlrty .975 1 .975 1.972 .162 
Invlvmnt 14.832 1 14.832 30.018 .000 
RA_Level 14.100 2 7.050 14.269 .000 
Metacog_Exp .236 1 .236 .477 .491 
RA_Level * Metacog_Exp 3.891 2 1.946 3.938 .021 
Error 94.866 192 .494   
69 
 
Total 2772.875 200    
Corrected Total 141.124 199    
a. R Squared = .328 (Adjusted R Squared 
= .303)  
    
 
Table 6-2: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
    
Dependent Variable:   Persuasion   
    
RA_Level Metacognitive express Mean Std. Deviation N 
low easy 3.2941 .58863 34 
difficult 2.9929 .79633 35 
Total 3.1413 .71290 69 
mid easy 3.7794 .69020 34 
difficult 3.8182 .60037 33 
Total 3.7985 .64291 67 
high easy 3.7500 .91140 32 
difficult 4.1953 .88840 32 
Total 3.9727 .92057 64 
Total easy 3.6050 .76474 100 
difficult 3.6500 .91632 100 
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Total 3.6275 .84212 200 
 
Table 6-3: P-value of the simple t-test for the difference of estimated marginal means between different 
groups. 
 Low Mid High 
Between Meta_Ease and 
Meta_Diff 
0.0326 0.7134 0.0522 
    
 Between Low/Mid Between Low/High Between Mid/High 
Meta_Ease 0.0028 0.8564 0.02 
Meta_Diff 0.00001  0.0176 0.00001 
 
Table 7: 2-Way ANOVA for NFC and Metacognitive Experience on persuasion 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
     
Dependent Variable:   Persuasion   
     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 21.978a 5 4.396 6.190 .000 
Intercept 83.738 1 83.738 117.927 .000 
Invlvmnt 19.761 1 19.761 27.829 .000 
Fmlrty 2.914 1 2.914 4.104 .045 
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Metacog_Exp .063 1 .063 .089 .766 
NFC_level .437 1 .437 .616 .434 
Metacog_Exp * NFC_level 1.487 1 1.487 2.094 .150 
Error 89.471 126 .710   
Total 1781.375 132    
Corrected Total 111.449 131    
a. R Squared = .197 (Adjusted R 
Squared = .165) 
     
 
Table 8:  reliability 
Table 8-1: 
 Cronbach’s Alpha N of items 
Familiarity .875 3 
Involvement .919 6 
Need for cognition .884 6 
Resource Availability .896 5 
Persuasion  .852 4 
Attitude toward Ads .925 5 
Attitude toward Brands .963 5 
Certainty .875 6 
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Img path .738 3 
Analytical path .488 3 
Purchase intention .905 3 
Table 8-2:  
Item-Total 
Statistics 
    
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 




Cronbach's Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Anlytcl1 11.0104 3.996 .334 .373 
Anlytcl2 11.9306 2.741 .254 .555 
Anlytcl3 11.2604 3.496 .382 .277 
 
Table 9: Hayes’ model test for Study 2 
Run MATRIX procedure: 
***************** PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Version 3.4 ***************** 
          Written by Andrew F. Hayes, Ph.D.       www.afhayes.com 
    Documentation available in Hayes (2018). www.guilford.com/p/hayes3 
************************************************************************** 
Model  : 15 
    Y  : M_persn 
    X  : M_NFC 
    M  : M_RA 
    W  : Metacog_ 
Covariates: 
 M_Invlv  M_Fmlrty 
Sample 







          R       R-sq          MSE          F               df1        df2                p 
      .4400      .1936      .6675    22.7316     3.0000   284.0000      .0000 
 
Model 
                      coeff         se              t              p          LLCI       ULCI 
constant     3.7260      .2826    13.1848      .0000     3.1697     4.2822 
M_NFC         .0588      .0494     1.1898      .2351     -.0385      .1560 
M_Invlv       .2286      .0439     5.2047      .0000      .1421      .3150 





          R       R-sq        MSE          F        df1        df2          p 
      .5699      .3248      .4928    19.2393     7.0000   280.0000      .0000 
 
Model 
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant     1.0307      .9460     1.0895      .2769     -.8316     2.8929 
M_NFC         .3065      .1391     2.2028      .0284      .0326      .5804 
M_RA          .0948      .1530      .6197      .5360     -.2063      .3959 
Metacog_     -.2859      .5935     -.4816      .6304    -1.4542      .8825 
Int_1        -.1966      .0856    -2.2968      .0224     -.3651     -.0281 
Int_2         .1314      .0933     1.4092      .1599     -.0522      .3150 
M_Invlv       .1544      .0396     3.8953      .0001      .0764      .2324 
M_Fmlrty      .0817      .0332     2.4597      .0145      .0163      .1471 
 
Product terms key: 
 Int_1    :        M_NFC    x        Metacog_ 
 Int_2    :        M_RA     x        Metacog_ 
 
Test(s) of highest order unconditional interaction(s): 
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       R2-chng          F        df1        df2          p 
X*W      .0127     5.2755     1.0000   280.0000      .0224 
M*W      .0048     1.9859     1.0000   280.0000      .1599 
---------- 
    Focal predict: M_NFC    (X) 
          Mod var: Metacog_ (W) 
 
Conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of the moderator(s): 
   Metacog_     Effect         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
     1.0000      .1099      .0634     1.7344      .0840     -.0148      .2346 
     2.0000     -.0867      .0576    -1.5043      .1336     -.2002      .0268 
****************** DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF X ON Y ***************** 
 
Conditional direct effect(s) of X on Y: 
   Metacog_     Effect         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
     1.0000      .1099      .0634     1.7344      .0840     -.0148      .2346 
     2.0000     -.0867      .0576    -1.5043      .1336     -.2002      .0268 
 
Conditional indirect effects of X on Y: 
INDIRECT EFFECT: 
 M_NFC       ->    M_RA        ->    M_persn 
 
   Metacog_     Effect     BootSE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
     1.0000      .0133      .0130     -.0086      .0422 
     2.0000      .0210      .0202     -.0134      .0672 
 
Index of moderated mediation (difference between conditional indirect effects): 
              Index     BootSE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
Metacog_      .0077      .0102     -.0064      .0341 
*********************** ANALYSIS NOTES AND ERRORS ************************ 
 
Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output: 
  95.0000 
Number of bootstrap samples for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals: 
  5000 
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NOTE: Variables names longer than eight characters can produce incorrect output. 
      Shorter variable names are recommended. 
------ END MATRIX ----- 
Table 10: MNOVA for NFC*Metacognitive Experience on ad evaluation 
Table 10-1: Wilks’ Lambda 
Multivari
ate Testsa 
         
 Effect Value F 
Hypothesi










Intercept Pillai's Trace .441 29.798b 5.000 189.000 .000 .441 148.992 1.000 
Wilks' Lambda .559 29.798b 5.000 189.000 .000 .441 148.992 1.000 
Hotelling's Trace .788 29.798b 5.000 189.000 .000 .441 148.992 1.000 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.788 29.798b 5.000 189.000 .000 .441 148.992 1.000 
M_Invlv Pillai's Trace .252 12.722b 5.000 189.000 .000 .252 63.611 1.000 
Wilks' Lambda .748 12.722b 5.000 189.000 .000 .252 63.611 1.000 
Hotelling's Trace .337 12.722b 5.000 189.000 .000 .252 63.611 1.000 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.337 12.722b 5.000 189.000 .000 .252 63.611 1.000 
M_Fmlrty Pillai's Trace .097 4.046b 5.000 189.000 .002 .097 20.231 .949 
Wilks' Lambda .903 4.046b 5.000 189.000 .002 .097 20.231 .949 
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Hotelling's Trace .107 4.046b 5.000 189.000 .002 .097 20.231 .949 
Roy's Largest 
Root 




Pillai's Trace .054 2.140b 5.000 189.000 .062 .054 10.700 .697 
Wilks' Lambda .946 2.140b 5.000 189.000 .062 .054 10.700 .697 
Hotelling's Trace .057 2.140b 5.000 189.000 .062 .054 10.700 .697 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.057 2.140b 5.000 189.000 .062 .054 10.700 .697 
NFC_level Pillai's Trace .065 2.635b 5.000 189.000 .025 .065 13.174 .799 
Wilks' Lambda .935 2.635b 5.000 189.000 .025 .065 13.174 .799 
Hotelling's Trace .070 2.635b 5.000 189.000 .025 .065 13.174 .799 
Roy's Largest 
Root 





Pillai's Trace .031 1.226b 5.000 189.000 .298 .031 6.132 .430 
Wilks' Lambda .969 1.226b 5.000 189.000 .298 .031 6.132 .430 
Hotelling's Trace .032 1.226b 5.000 189.000 .298 .031 6.132 .430 
Roy's Largest 
Root 


















         
b. Exact 
statistic 






         
 








Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 













M_persn 41.622a 5 8.324 14.541 .000 .274 72.706 1.000 
M_AtdAd 91.472b 5 18.294 19.028 .000 .330 95.138 1.000 
M_AtdBrnd 77.302c 5 15.460 12.493 .000 .245 62.466 1.000 
M_Crtnty 25.574d 5 5.115 4.978 .000 .114 24.889 .982 
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M_PI 105.307e 5 21.061 10.741 .000 .218 53.704 1.000 
Intercept M_persn 21.181 1 21.181 36.999 .000 .161 36.999 1.000 
M_AtdAd 52.948 1 52.948 55.069 .000 .222 55.069 1.000 
M_AtdBrnd 71.048 1 71.048 57.413 .000 .229 57.413 1.000 
M_Crtnty 120.933 1 120.933 117.694 .000 .379 117.694 1.000 
M_PI 52.872 1 52.872 26.964 .000 .123 26.964 .999 
M_Invlv M_persn 21.225 1 21.225 37.075 .000 .161 37.075 1.000 
M_AtdAd 54.545 1 54.545 56.730 .000 .227 56.730 1.000 
M_AtdBrnd 35.742 1 35.742 28.883 .000 .130 28.883 1.000 
M_Crtnty 3.465 1 3.465 3.372 .068 .017 3.372 .447 
M_PI 70.689 1 70.689 36.049 .000 .157 36.049 1.000 
M_Fmlrty M_persn 1.378 1 1.378 2.407 .122 .012 2.407 .339 
M_AtdAd .661 1 .661 .688 .408 .004 .688 .131 
M_AtdBrnd 1.969 1 1.969 1.591 .209 .008 1.591 .241 
M_Crtnty 2.852 1 2.852 2.776 .097 .014 2.776 .381 
M_PI 1.671 1 1.671 .852 .357 .004 .852 .151 
Metacog_experi
ence 
M_persn 2.190 1 2.190 3.826 .052 .019 3.826 .495 
M_AtdAd 6.383 1 6.383 6.639 .011 .033 6.639 .727 
M_AtdBrnd 10.434 1 10.434 8.432 .004 .042 8.432 .824 
M_Crtnty .074 1 .074 .072 .789 .000 .072 .058 
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M_PI 13.069 1 13.069 6.665 .011 .033 6.665 .729 
NFC_level M_persn .003 1 .003 .005 .941 .000 .005 .051 
M_AtdAd .765 1 .765 .796 .374 .004 .796 .144 
M_AtdBrnd 2.526 1 2.526 2.041 .155 .010 2.041 .295 
M_Crtnty 7.007 1 7.007 6.819 .010 .034 6.819 .738 




M_persn 2.482 1 2.482 4.335 .039 .022 4.335 .545 
M_AtdAd 5.025 1 5.025 5.226 .023 .026 5.226 .624 
M_AtdBrnd 5.496 1 5.496 4.442 .036 .022 4.442 .555 
M_Crtnty 1.902 1 1.902 1.851 .175 .010 1.851 .273 
M_PI 7.306 1 7.306 3.726 .055 .019 3.726 .484 
Error M_persn 110.487 193 .572      
M_AtdAd 185.564 193 .961      
M_AtdBrnd 238.837 193 1.237      
M_Crtnty 198.312 193 1.028      
M_PI 378.451 193 1.961      
Total M_persn 2768.000 199       
M_AtdAd 6071.240 199       
M_AtdBrnd 6476.400 199       
M_Crtnty 5801.083 199       
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M_PI 5438.778 199       
Corrected Total M_persn 152.109 198       
M_AtdAd 277.037 198       
M_AtdBrnd 316.139 198       
M_Crtnty 223.886 198       
M_PI 483.758 198       
a. R Squared 
= .274 (Adjusted 
R Squared 
= .255) 
         
b. R Squared 
= .330 (Adjusted 
R Squared 
= .313) 
         
c. R Squared 
= .245 (Adjusted 
R Squared 
= .225) 
         
d. R Squared 
= .114 (Adjusted 
R Squared 
= .091) 
         
e. R Squared 
= .218 (Adjusted 
R Squared 
= .197) 








Table 11: UNIANOVA of RA and Metacognitive Experience on Certainty 
Table11-1: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Tests of Between-Subjects 
Effects 
      
Dependent Variable:   
M_Crtnty   






Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 37.646a 5 7.529 7.872 .000 .178 
Intercept 150.583 1 150.583 157.438 .000 .464 
M_Invlv .247 1 .247 .259 .612 .001 
M_Fmlrty 1.400 1 1.400 1.464 .228 .008 
RA_level 15.709 1 15.709 16.425 .000 .083 
Metacog_experience .140 1 .140 .147 .702 .001 
RA_level * 
Metacog_experience 
5.068 1 5.068 5.299 .022 .028 
Error 174.075 182 .956    
Total 5418.000 188     
Corrected Total 211.721 187     
a. R Squared = .178 (Adjusted 
R Squared = .155) 




Table11-2: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
    
Dependent 
Variable:   
M_Crtnty   
    
RA_level Metacog_experience Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
1 1 4.7074 1.04032 45 
2 5.0139 .98321 48 
Total 4.8656 1.01744 93 
3 1 5.8333 .79791 51 
2 5.4394 1.09974 44 
Total 5.6509 .96483 95 
Total 1 5.3056 1.07488 96 
2 5.2174 1.05662 92 
Total 5.2624 1.06405 188 
 
Table 11-3: P-value of the simple t-test for the difference of estimated marginal means between 
different groups. 
 Low RA High RA 
Between Meta_Ease and Meta_Diff 0.1482 0.0524 
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 Meta_Ease Meta_Diff 
Between Low RA and High RA 0.0000  0.0544 
 
Table 12: ANOVA on imagery processing 
Table 12-1: ANOVA of NFC and Metacog_Experience on Imagery processing 
Tests of Between-Subjects 
Effects 
      
Dependent Variable:   
M_img_Reverse   










Corrected Model 5.943a 3 1.981 1.068 .364 .016 
Intercept 4717.128 1 4717.128 2542.878 .000 .929 
Metacog_experience 5.881 1 5.881 3.170 .077 .016 
NFC_level .053 1 .053 .028 .866 .000 
Metacog_experience * 
NFC_level 
.007 1 .007 .004 .952 .000 
Error 361.732 195 1.855    
Total 5115.333 199     
Corrected Total 367.675 198     
a. R Squared = .016 
(Adjusted R Squared = .001) 




Table 12-2: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
    
Dependent Variable:   
M_img_Reverse   
    
Metacog_experienc
e NFC_level Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
1 1 5.0815 1.14846 45 
3 5.0370 1.47042 54 
Total 5.0572 1.32740 99 
2 1 4.7246 1.33390 46 
3 4.7037 1.43433 54 
Total 4.7133 1.38212 100 
Total 1 4.9011 1.25166 91 
3 4.8704 1.45535 108 
Total 4.8844 1.36270 199 
 
Table 12-3: P-value of the simple t-test for the difference of estimated marginal means between 
different groups. 
 Low NFC High NFC 
Between Meta_Ease and Meta_Diff 0.1746 0.2358 
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 Meta_Ease Meta_Diff 
Between Low NFC and High NFC 0.8662  0.94 
 
Table 13: ANOVA on analytical processing 
Table 13-1: ANOVA of NFC and Metacognitive Experience on Analytical processing 
Tests of Between-Subjects 
Effects 
      
Dependent Variable:   
M_Anlytcl_2   






Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 14.127a 3 4.709 6.838 .000 .095 
Intercept 7107.436 1 7107.436 10320.369 .000 .981 
Metacog_experience .872 1 .872 1.266 .262 .006 
NFC_level 12.970 1 12.970 18.833 .000 .088 
Metacog_experience * 
NFC_level 
.187 1 .187 .272 .603 .001 
Error 134.293 195 .689    
Total 7360.500 199     
Corrected Total 148.420 198     
a. R Squared = .095 
(Adjusted R Squared = .081) 




Table 13-2: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
    
Dependent Variable:   
M_Anlytcl_2   
    
Metacog_experienc
e NFC_level Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
1 1 5.7778 .87617 45 
3 6.3519 .73092 54 
Total 6.0909 .84625 99 
2 1 5.7065 .89179 46 
3 6.1574 .82887 54 
Total 5.9500 .88335 100 
Total 1 5.7418 .87991 91 
3 6.2546 .78388 108 
Total 6.0201 .86579 199 
 
Table 13-3: P-value of the simple t-test for the difference of estimated marginal means between 
different groups. 
 Low NFC High NFC 
Between Meta_Ease and Meta_Diff 0.7012 0.1988 
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 Meta_Ease Meta_Diff 





Appendix C: Main Study Questionnaire 
Study 1 
Thank you for participating!      
This survey is to understand how consumers purchase products. It includes 1 photography of cars and 17 
related questions which will take around 7 minutes. Please read the following general instructions 
before you begin the survey. 
 - Please use a computer instead of other devices.      
- Keep your browser window maximized.      
- Please wait until the entire image comes up on your screen.           
- The collected data will be confidential and anonymous, and your personal information will not be 
disclosed.     
- Your completion code will be on the final page. 
- Please answer carefully, 2 detected question is included; if you randomly answer the questionnaire, 
you might not get the completion code.         
If you want to participate the survey and are prepared well, please click "I Agree." If you click "I do not 
Agree", the survey will ended. Then, click the ">>" arrow below to start. 
o I Agree  
o I do not Agree  
 
Today's research is about the Sedan. Before we start, please answer several questions about how much 
you are familiar with it. 
Q1 Please choose the option below to tell how much do you know about the Sedan? 




o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Very knowledgeable 








Q2 Please give me your evaluation of the Sedan 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Relevant 

















Involving o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Not involving 
Means a 






Please imagine that you are viewing a popular magazine Motor Trend on the following pages, you will 
be exposed to one page of it and will be asked to give your opinion towards it. 
This is a new anonymous model of sedan from a global top 10 Best Selling car Manufacturers in 2019, 





Q3 Please choose one of the option for each question which accurately describe your feeling towards 
the ads. The strength increase with the number, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extreme amount). 
 
None/Not 
at all (1) 
a tiny bit 
(2) 














did you pay 
to the ad?  






in the ad?  







in the ad?  






in the ad ?  








in the ad?  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
6.Please 
choose the 
fifth option : 
A lot   




Q4 How worthwhile you think driving the recommended model of sedan would be to you personally as 
a way to do transportation?  
o Extremely worthless  
o Somewhat worthless  
o Neither worthless nor worthwhile  
o Somewhat worthwhile  
o Extremely worthwhile  
 
Q5 How convincing you think the ad is? 
o Strongly unconvincing  
o Somewhat unconvincing  
o Neither  unconvincing nor  convincing  
o Somewhat convincing  
o Strongly convincing  
 
Q6 How effective you think the content of the ad would be in persuading someone to purchase the 
recommended model of sedan rather than other brands of sedan?  
o Not effective at all  
o Slightly effective  
o Moderately effective  
o Very effective  




Q7 How interested you would be in receiving more information about the recommended model of 
sedan? 
o Not interesting at all  
o Slightly interesting  
o Moderately interesting  
o Very interesting  
o Extremely interesting  
 
 
For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the statement is characteristic of you. 
If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like you) please write a "1" to the left of 
the question; if the statement is extremely characteristic of you (very much like you) please write a "5" 
next to the question. Of course, a statement may be neither extremely uncharacteristic nor extremely 
characteristic of you; if so, please use the number in the middle of the scale that describes the best fit. 
Please keep the following scale in mind as you rate each of the statements below: 1 = extremely 
uncharacteristic; 2 = somewhat uncharacteristic; 3 = uncertain; 4 = somewhat characteristic; 5 = 
extremely characteristic.  
 
Q8 I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
o 1 (Extremely Uncharacteristic)  
o 2 (Somewhat Uncharacteristic)  
o 3 (Uncertain)  
o 4 (Somewhat Characteristic)  




Q9 I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
o 1 (Extremely Uncharacteristic)  
o 2 (Somewhat Uncharacteristic)  
o 3 (Uncertain)  
o 4 (Somewhat Characteristic)  
o 5(Extremely Characteristic)  
 
Q10 Thinking is not my idea of fun.  
   
o 1 (Extremely Uncharacteristic)  
o 2 (Somewhat Uncharacteristic)  
o 3 (Uncertain)  
o 4 (Somewhat Characteristic)  
o 5(Extremely Characteristic)  
 
Q11 I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my 
thinking abilities 
o 1 (Extremely Uncharacteristic)  
o 2 (Somewhat Uncharacteristic)  
o 3 (Uncertain)  
o 4 (Somewhat Characteristic)  
o 5(Extremely Characteristic)  
 
Q12 I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.  
o 1 (Extremely Uncharacteristic)  
o 2 (Somewhat Uncharacteristic)  
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o 3 (Uncertain)  
o 4 (Somewhat Characteristic)  
o 5(Extremely Characteristic)  
 
Q13 I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important 
but does not require much thought.  
o 1 (Extremely Uncharacteristic)  
o 2 (Somewhat Uncharacteristic)  
o 3 (Uncertain)  
o 4 (Somewhat Characteristic)  
o 5(Extremely Characteristic)  
 
Q14 What’s your gender? 
o Male  
o Female  
 
Q15 How old are you (please only enter specific number)? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q16 Please specify your ethnicity. 
o White  
o Black or African American  
o American Indian or Alaska Native  
o Asian  
o Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander  
o Hispanic or Latino  
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o other  
 
Q17 What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If current enrolled, highest 
degree received. 
o No schooling completed  
o Nursery school to 8th grade  
o Some high school, no diploma  
o High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED)  
o Some college credit, no degree  
o Trade/Technical/Vocational training  
o College's Degree  
o Bachelor's  Degree  
o Master's Degree  
o PHD's or higher Degree  
 
Q18 
    
Congratulations!  You finish it !   
  Here is your ID: ${e://Field/Ramdom%20ID}   
    
Copy this value to paste into M-turk   
    
When you have copied this ID, please click the next button to submit your survey   
    






Q1-Q6: NFC distinguish (The same as Q8-Q13 in the study 1) 
Today's research is about the Laundry Detergent. Before we start, please answer several questions 
about how much you are familiar with it. 
Q7-Q8: Familiarity and Involvement (The same as Q1 and Q2 in the study 1) 
 
Please imagine that you are viewing a magazine you like and here comes an ad of a new brand of liquid 
laundry detergent: Superb. On the following pages, you will be exposed to that ad and will be asked to 





Q9 Please choose one of the option for each question which accurately describe your feeling towards 
the ads. The strength increase with the number, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extreme amount). 
 
None/Not 


















did you pay 
to the ad ?  






in the ad ?  







in the ad ?  






in the ad ?  








in the ad?  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
6.Please 
choose the 
fifth option  




Q10 How worthwhile you think trying to use Superb detergent would be to you personally as a way to 
do laundry?  
o Extremely worthless  
o Somewhat worthless  
o Neither worthless nor worthwhile  
o Somewhat worthwhile  
o Extremely worthwhile  
 
Q11 How convincing you think the ad is? 
o Strongly unconvincing  
o Somewhat unconvincing  
o Neither  unconvincing nor  convincing  
o Somewhat convincing  
o Strongly convincing  
 
Q12 How effective you think the content of the ad would be in persuading someone to purchase Superb 
detergent rather than other brands of detergents?  
o Not effective at all  
o Slightly effective  
o Moderately effective  
o Very effective  




Q13 How interested you would be in receiving more information about Superb laundry detergent? 
o Not interesting at all  
o Slightly interesting  
o Moderately interesting  
o Very interesting  
o Extremely interesting  
 
Q14 
From your point of view, did the Ads for 'Superb Detergent' make you feel:   
(The closer to the Endpoint, the stronger feeling towards the description) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Bad o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Good 
Unpleasant o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Pleasant 
Unfavorable o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Favorable 
Worthless o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Valuable 
Not 





Q15 Please describe your overall feelings about the Brand described in the ads you just read 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Unappealing o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Appealing 
Bad o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Good 
Unpleasant o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Pleasant 
Unfavorable o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Favorable 
Unlikable o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Likable 
 

























really is?  




























to have?  



































Q17 For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent that you agree with it.  
 
































o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Please choose the options to describe to what extent that you engaged in the behaviors below when 
you viewed and evaluated the ads  
(The larger of the value of option, the stronger extent of the behaviors you engaged in). 
Q18 I tried to form a picture of the product 
o Not very much (1)  
o (2)  
o (3)  
o Moderate amount (4)  
o (5)  
o (6)  




Q19 I tried to use as much information about the product features as possible to evaluate it 
o Strongly disagree (1)  
o (2)  
o (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree(4)  
o (5)  
o (6)  
o Strongly agree(7)  
 
Q20 I imagined myself using the detergent in the ad to do laundry 
o Not very much (1)  
o (2)  
o (3)  
o Moderate amount (4)  
o (5)  
o (6)  
o To a great deal (7)  
 
Q21 I evaluated the laundry detergent feature by feature rather than evaluating it as a whole 
o Strongly disagree (1)  
o (2)  
o (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree(4)  
o (5)  
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o (6)  
o Strongly agree(7)  
 
Q22 My evaluation were based on personal impressions and feelings 
o Not very much (1)  
o (2)  
o (3)  
o Moderate amount (4)  
o (5)  
o (6)  
o To a great deal (7)  
 
Q23 My evaluations were based on careful thinking and reasoning. 
o Strongly disagree (1)  
o (2)  
o (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree(4)  
o (5)  
o (6)  
o Strongly agree(7)  
 






Q24 How likely are you to buy the product of 'Superb' in the ads the next time you shop for the laundry 
detergent? 
o Extremely unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly likely  
o Moderately likely  
o Extremely likely  
 
Q25 How likely are you to consider the product of 'Superb' the next time you shop for the laundry 
detergent? 
o Extremely unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly likely  
o Moderately likely  




Q26 How likely are you to recommend to someone else the 'Superb' laundry detergent? 
o Extremely unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly likely  
o Moderately likely  
o Extremely likely  
 
 
Q27 –Q 32 Demographic information collection, the same as those in Study 1. 
